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DILEMMAS OF GROUP AUTONOMY:
RESIDENTIAL ASSOCIATIONS AND
COMMUNITY
Gregory S. Alexandert
We are a society of groups. De Tocqueville's observation that
the principle of association shapes American society remains as valid
today as it was in the mid-nineteenth century.1 For us, as for others,
the vita activa2 is participation in a seemingly limitless variety of
groups.
The importance of group activity in our national character has
strongly influenced the agenda of political questions that recur in
American political and legal theory. One of the fundamental nor-
mative questions on this agenda concerns the proper relationship
between groups and the polity. To what extent should the polity
foster connections between associations and the larger community?3
Alternatively, what degree of autonomy ought the polity, in our
"segmented society," recognize for social groups, "each presuming
autonomy in its own domain, each requiring homogeneity of its
t Professor of Law, Cornell University. I am grateful to colleagues and friends at
Cornell and elsewhere for their reactions to earlier drafts of this article: Drucilla Cor-
nell, Alan Freeman, William Fisher, Gerald Frug, David Lyons, Mari Matsuda, Harold
McDougall, Elizabeth Mensch, Frank Michelman, Russell Osgood, Carol Rose, Bernard
Rudden, Steven Shiffrin, Joseph Singer, David Williams, Joan Williams, and Susan Wil-
liams. Through their suggestions and criticisms, they have given me a deeper under-
standing of community.
1 In a repeatedly cited passage, de Tocqueville states:
Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions constantly
form associations. They have not only commercial and manufacturing
companies, in which all take part, but associations of a thousand other
kinds.... Wherever, at the head of some new undertaking, you see the
Government in France, or a man of rank in England, in the United States
you will be sure to find an association.
2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCJ.CY IN AMERICA 128-29 (Schocken ed. 1961). See also
1 id. at 216 (America uses and applies the principle of association more successfully and
widely than any other country).
2 See HANNAH W. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION: A STUDY OF THE CENTRAL Di-
LEMMAS FACING MODERN MAN 12-17 (1958).
3 I do not mean to suggest that fostering connection between groups and the
larger community invariably denies group autonomy. Much depends on what meaning
one attaches to autonomy. This Article represents an attempt to define both group life
and community in a way that breaks out of the deadlock that some meanings create. By
"alternatively," my purpose is to acknowledge that the vision of fostering connections
between groups and the larger community will often be viewed as intruding on auto-
nomy-individual or group.
2 CORNELL L4 W REVIEW [Vol. 75:1
membership, and each demanding the right to fulfill its destiny with-
out interference"? 4
This Article considers two approaches to the question of group
autonomy in the context of residential associations and examines
the implications of each for the standard of review that courts
should apply to the rules and regulations of residential associations.
One approach is based on the theories of interest-group pluralism
and public choice; the other, on communitarianism. On the surface,
both of these approaches share a commitment to the importance of
groups in social and political life, but they envision the relationship
between the individual, the group, and the polity in strikingly differ-
ent ways. The theory of interest-group pluralism 5 and its cognate,
public-choice theory, 6 in their normative moments seek to secure
for social groups a strong form of autonomy from collective inter-
vention. Their commitment to strong group autonomy ultimately
derives, however, from a commitment to individual autonomy.7 Plu-
ralist and public-choice theorists believe that individuals associate
with each other only to achieve specific ends coincidentally shared.
For pluralist theory, group autonomy is rooted in the political vision
that seeks radically to separate the public and private realms and to
define for the latter an expansive scope.
Communitarian theory similarly emphasizes the desirability of
group forms of life.8 But, in strong contrast to pluralist and public-
4 See ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEGMENTED SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
MEANING OF AMERICA (1975).
5 Prominent examples of interest-group pluralist theory include ROBERT A. DAHL,
A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1972); EARL LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS OF POLI-
TICS (1952); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1953), J. David Green-
stone, Group Theories, in MICROPOLITICAL THEORY 243 (Fred I. Greenstein & Nelson W.
Polsby eds. 1975) provides a useful overview of the literature.
6 The following have made important contributions to public choice theory:
MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965);JAMEs BUCHANAN & GORDON
TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General The-
ory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976).
7 See infra Part III(A)(1).
8 Some of the important recent contributions to communitarian political and legal
theory include BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR
A NEW AGE (1984); SAMUEL BOWLES & HERBERT GINTIS, DEMOCRACY & CAPITALISM:
PROPERTY, COMMUNITY, AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF MODERN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1986);
MICHAELJ. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OFJUSTICE (1982); ROBERTO M. UNGER,
KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); Drucilla L. Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Recon-
struction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 291 (1985) [hereinafter Cornell, Reconstruction]; Ger-
ald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980); 2 CHARLES TAYLOR,
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES (1985).
Communitarians share with modern republicans the task of developing new vocabu-
laries that are appropriate for our modern culture. Their common challenge is to trans-
form a past rhetoric by purging it of its exclusionary features. As political traditions,
republicanism and communitarianism carry a lot of the same baggage. Skeptics of the
attempts to develop both traditions into a politics for the late twentieth century have
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choice theories, communitarian theory understands group activity
and individuality as simultaneously present aspects of the human
personality, or self. The central problem with which much recent
communitarian theory struggles is how the polity may harmonize
the dual aspects-social and individual-of the self, encouraging
group life without sacrificing individual identity. The polity's har-
monizing responsibility requires that it recognize the principle of
group autonomy, but not in the form defined by pluralist theory.
Communitarianism's opposition to strong group autonomy
seems paradoxical at first. One might expect that its normative
commitment to the view that humans thrive only when they interact
with others in environments of shared values favors a mode of social
organization in which nomic clusters, replacing the individual as the
basic unit, are free to pursue their conceptions of the good, just as
classical liberalism promotes the autonomy of the individual. A cen-
tral purpose of this Article is to insist that the rhetoric of commu-
nity, strategically used for the purpose of securing a strong form of
group autonomy9 for residential groups,' 0 undermines, rather than
emphasized that historically both republican and communitarian rhetoric have been
used in the service of overtly exclusionary social practices.
The strategy for republicans and communitarians in meeting that challenge must be
historicist and pragmatic. Appropriating a past political rhetoric involves transforma-
tion. Those who appropriate the vocabulary of a political tradition seek to make it their
own, to recreate it. They attempt to tap the tradition's unrealized potential for creating
a different politics. See Drucilla L. Cornell, Institutionalization of Meaning, Recollective Imagi-
nation and the Potentialfor Transformative Legal Interpretation, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1135, 1204-
1212 (1988) [hereinafter Cornell, Institutionalization].
At the same time, recollective imagination does not mean that traditions are infi-
nitely malleable. If working within a tradition means anything at all, it means that there
are constraints on what we can say. Recollective imagination is constrained to the extent
that society has a well-defined understanding of the political tradition. Particular tradi-
tions may differ in this respect, and those traditions that are more specifically defined
may be less malleable than those that have less settled meanings. Recent writings by
feminists and minority scholars have given those who wish to appropriate the rhetoric of
civic republicanism and the rhetoric of community to create a politics of inclusion good
reasons for concern about whether either tradition can be so transformed. We can dis-
cover the limits of both traditions, however, only through attempts at transformation.
What I offer here is an attempt to indicate how, in one context, community might be
recreated as a politics of inclusion.
9 By "strong autonomy," I mean the power of groups to govern their affairs with
minimal interference from the legal system-that is, a largely non-interventionist resolu-
tion to what might be called the "inside-outside" problem. Group autonomy is invaria-
bly a matter of degree. Precisely because they are social, groups cannot immunize
themselves entirely from collective constraints. At the same time, political regimes
could not entirely eliminate groups as a mode of social activity even if they wanted to do
so. Contemporary arguments for strong group autonomy concede the necessity for cer-
tain minimal legal restrictions on group self-governance, such as proscriptions of exclu-
sionary practices based on race. Beyond these constraints, however, they resolve the
inside-outside problem by permitting groups to create walls between themselves and the
outside world.
10 While I am skeptical that all-perhaps even most-common unit developments
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advances, community as a regulative ideal. Public-choice and plu-
ralist theorists frequently have used the rhetoric of community to
promote their contractarian vision, but their very contractarianism
reinforces the core dilemma of community, namely, the problem of
exclusion. Unlike pluralist/public choice theory, communitarian
theory recognizes that the very values to be gained by group auton-
omy may require that the polity intervene in the affairs of groups-
all groups-to address the problem of exclusion.
Precisely for this reason, communitarians object to contractari-
ans using communitarian rhetoric. Contractarians' use of that rhet-
oric perverts the ideal of community.la Interpreting community as
an ethic of inclusion, communitarians regard social intervention as
sometimes necessary to prevent groups from practicing unaccept-
able forms of exclusion. Just what exclusionary social practices
should be considered unacceptable is, of course, an enormously
controversial question. It is just because that question is open-
ended and intensely political, however, that we cannot permit
groups to isolate themselves from dialogue with the rest of society.
Strong group autonomy would enable groups to end all public dia-
logue, in effect imposing their answers to questions of exclusion and
privileging their interpretation of "community." In the end, such
an interpretation transforms community into a strategy for
domination.
At the same time, however, the form that such intervention
takes matters a great deal, for collective social intervention itself
runs the risk of perpetuating domination under the guise of commu-
nity. Several commentators have argued that adjudication is an odd
can plausibly be described as communities, I do think that at least some of them exhibit
communitarian characteristics. Just what proportion of them can plausibly be so de-
scribed I am in no position to say. My view is that common unit developments are best
understood as mixtures of contractarian and communitarian outlooks. See infra text ac-
companying notes 138-48.
11 I want to clarify my meaning of community as both a rhetoric and as a "regula-
tive ideal." Both communitarians and their critics have used the term "community" in
many different (and sometimes contradictory) senses. (This practice itself is a larger and
important story of the rhetoric of community.) My own rhetoric of community is not
essentialist. To the contrary, it is altogether pragmatic, as my focus on the rhetoric of
community suggests. Agnostic (or, better, uninterested) in metaphysical questions as I
am, I do not mean to claim that that there is some irreducible core to human nature that
must include community. This interpretation puts some distance between me and many
of the texts that I have labelled communitarian. In discussing community as a regulative
ideal, I mean to appeal to the rhetoric of community as, to borrow James Boyle's lan-
guage, "a source of aspirational stories through which we can explain our own local
moral and political struggles." James Boyle, Modernist Social Theory: Robert Unger's Passion,
98 HARV. L. REv. 1066, 1082 (1985). Community as a regulative ideal is a vision of a
society that is worth striving to create, even if it can be created only incompletely. My
enterprise here, then, is perhaps best described as using the rhetoric of community as
both a "discursive strategy" and a "strategic discourse."
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means of implementing communitarian ideals of participation, dia-
logue, and reciprocity.' 2 They favor more direct forms of social in-
teraction, like local institutions, as means for practicing
community. 13 But "localities have a disturbing history of intoler-
ance toward non-conforming groups" and individuals. 14 Further-
more, while it is desirable to encourage direct civic participation
through small-scale institutions, recourse to adjudication is some-
times unavoidable, as when excluded persons claim legal entitle-
ment to participate in group life,' 5 or when dissident group
members claim an entitlement to deviate from group requirements.
In these situations, the question is what judicial practices maintain
interaction between competing visions of desirable modes of life
without sacrificing the integrity of groups.
As a vehicle for discussing the problem of autonomy for groups
in general, I will examine the status of residential groups in Ameri-
can society, specifically, the question of legal intervention into the
affairs of residential associations. 16 Residential associations, the
membership of which consists of all purchasers of property in so-
called common or planned unit developments, have proliferated so
much in the past two decades that they may represent the dominant
aspect of the late twentieth century contribution to American resi-
dential group life. The normative canon of these residential ar-
rangements consists of expressly stated rules in purchasers' deeds
that impose a wide variety of restrictions on members' use of their
property interests within the development. These rules range from
provisions that prohibit owners from selling their interests without
the express consent of the residential association's governing
board, 17 to restrictions on the minimum or maximum age of resi-
12 See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 97 YALE LJ. 1591 (1988); Paul
Brest, Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 175 (1986).
13 For some of the work specifically discussing local institutions as mechanisms for
implementing communal values, see B. BARBER, supra note 8; JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BE-
YOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY (1980); Frug, supra note 8; and Carol M. Rose, Planning
and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 839
(1983).
14 Abrams, supra note 12, at 1607.
15 See Harold A. McDougall, Social Movements, Law, and Implementation: A Clinical Di-
mension for the New Legal Process, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 83 (1989).
16 The most significant theoretical discussion of residential groups in the legal liter-
ature is the exchange between Robert Ellickson and Gerald Frug concerning the types of
intermediate groups that offer the greatest opportunity for robust forms of civic partici-
pation. See Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519
(1982) [hereinafter Ellickson, Cities]; Robert C. Ellickson, A Reply to Michelman and Frug,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1602 (1982) [hereinafter Ellickson, A Reply]; Gerald E. Frug, Cities and
Homeowners Associations: A Reply, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1589 (1982); Frug, supra note 8.
17 E.g., Mowatt v. 1540 Lake Shore Drive Corp., 385 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1967) (disa-
bling restraint valid if reasonable under the circumstances); Gale v. York Center Com-
munity Coop., 21 111. 2d 86, 171 N.E.2d 30 (1960) (right of preemption sustained); 68
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dent members, to restrictions on decor and architectural design.' 8
Developers also commonly have restricted occupants of units to a
"single family."' 9
Legal challenges to these internal group rules in recent years
directly pose the question of the appropriate relationship between
self-governing groups and the collective polity.20 Courts have
tended substantively to review these rules, applying a standard of
reasonableness that requires the rules of the group to conform not
only to the association's own internal values but to external values
as well-i.e., values that, in the court's judgment, are widely shared
throughout the rest of the polity.2 1
This judicial practice-and the status of residential associations
generally-has attracted considerable opposition in recent years.22
Beacon St., Inc. v. Sohier, 289 Mass. 354, 194 N.E. 303 (1935) (disabling restraint on
alienation sustained); Sanders v. Tropicana, Inc., 31 N.C. App. 276, 229 S.E.2d 304
(1976). See text accompanying notes 59-60 infra; Metropolitan Transp. Auth. v. Bruken
Realty Corp., 67 N.Y.2d 156, 492 N.E.2d 379, 501 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1986); Weisner v. 791
Park Ave. Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 426, 160 N.E.2d 720, 190 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1959) (disabling re-
straint on alienation sustained).
18 See, e.g., Rhue v. Cheyenne Homes, Inc., 168 Colo. 6, 449 P.2d 361 (1969); Syr-
ian Antiochian Orthodox Archdiocese v. Palisades Assocs., 110 N.J. Super. 34, 264 A.2d
257 (Ch. Div. 1970).
19 See, e.g., Bellarmine Hills Ass'n v. Residential Sys. Co., 84 Mich. App. 554, 269
N.W.2d 673 (1978); London v. Handicapped Facilities Bd., 637 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1982); Knudtson v. Trainor, 216 Neb. 653, 345 N.W.2d 4 (1984); Crane Neck
Ass'n v. New York City/Long Island County Serv. Group, 61 N.Y.2d 154, 460 N.E.2d
1336, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 804 (1984);Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d
1017 (Okla. 1985); Omega Corp. v. Malloy, 288 Va. 12, 319 S.E.2d 728 (1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1192 (1985); see also Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988). See generally Gerald Korngold, Single Family Use Cove-
nants: For Achieving a Balance between Traditional Family Life and Individual Autonomy, 22
U.C. DAvis L. REV. 951 (1989).
20 Common unit developments are organized as condominiums, cooperatives, or
planned developments. For my purposes, the differences among these forms are not
important. What is important are their shared characteristics. "Common interest devel-
opments are defined by shared property, by restrictions built into their deeds limiting
the uses of property, and by a mandatory homeowners' association which administers
the property and enforces the restrictions on its use." Stephen E. Barton & Carol J.
Silverman, Public Life in Private Governments: Neighborhoods with Shared Property 4
(Nov. 1987) (unpublished manuscript) (forthcoming in ANN. REV. URB. Soc.) [hereinaf-
ter Public Life].
21 For examples of cases applying the reasonableness requirement to internal con-
dominium or cooperative regulations other than restrictions on transfer, see Amoruso v.
Board of Managers of Westchester Hills Condominium, 38 A.D.2d 845, 846, 330
N.Y.S.2d 107, 109 (1972);Justice Court Mut. Hous. Coop. v. Sandow, 50 Misc. 2d 541,
544, 270 N.Y.S.2d 829, 832 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Forest Park Coop. v. Hellman, 2 Misc. 2d
183, 184, 152 N.Y.S.2d 685, 687 (Sup Ct. 1956).
22 See, e.g., Ellickson, Cities, supra note 16; Uriel Reichman, Judicial Review of Servi-
tudes, 7 J. LEGAL SrUD. 139 (1978) [hereinafter Reichman, Servitudes Review]; Uriel
Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 253
(1976) [hereinafter Reichman, Residential Governments]; Note,Judicial Review of Condomin-
ium Rulemaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 647 (1981) [hereinafter Note,JudicialReview]; Note, The
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Several commentators have criticized reasonableness review on the
basis of familiar notions of private ordering.23 In effect, they seek to
secure a strong form of autonomy for these residential groups, re-
quiring only that groups govern themselves consistently with their
own internal scheme of values and preferences. 24 Their arguments
for strong autonomy reflect the pluralist/public choice approach to
the nature and status of groups.25 With respect to the specific de-
bate over residential associations, I argue that communitarian the-
ory justifies substantive judicial review under the reasonableness
standard as a dialogic form of legal intervention. The experience
with residential associations indicates why we should reject strong
group autonomy for social groups in general as a social condition
that would pervert, rather than advance, the ideal of community.
I
Two VISIONS OF RESIDENTIAL LIFE
This section places the group character of common unit devel-
opments in a broader context by sketching two historical visions of
residential life in American culture. These sketches synthesize and
necessarily simplify-hopefully without distorting-ideas about the
desirablity of modes of living that various historians have pieced to-
gether in recent years.26
Rule of Law in Residential Associations, 99 HARV. L. REV. 472 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Rule
of Law].
23 See, e.g., Ellickson, Cities, supra note 16; Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The
Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 667 (1986) [hereinafter Ep-
stein, Past and Future]; Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
970 (1985) [hereinafter Epstein, Why Restrain].
24 For purposes of determining what degree of autonomy from legal intervention
residential associations ought to enjoy, Ellickson distinguishes between the association's
original rules and subsequent amendments. While courts should strongly defer to the
former individual, owners should be given much greater control over the actions of as-
sociation boards in amending association rules that, unlike adoption of the original
rules, would have redistributive effects. See Ellickson, Cities, supra note 16, at 1530-39.
25 See Michael Walzer, Liberalism and the Art of Separation, 12 POL. THEORY 315, 317
(1984):
[L]iberal theorists preached and practiced an art of separation. They
drew lines, marked off different realms, and created the sociopolitical
map with which we are still familiar.... Liberalism is a world of walls,
and each one creates a new liberty.
Focusing on the last sentence in this excerpt, I argue in this paper that Walzer is right in
his first claim but wrong, or at least radically incomplete, in his second. Liberal social
and political theories are theories of walls, between public and private, self and other,
family and market, and, as I discuss in this paper, groups and community. But for every
liberty created by a liberal wall, there is a concomitant relationship of domination. That
is the central dilemma of liberal group autonomy. It can be addressed by replacing walls
with boundaries, connecting group and community. Cf MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF
JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 31-63 (1983).
26 This section draws on several excellent recent histories of residential life in
America, including ROBERT FISHMAN, BOURGEOIS UTOPIAS: THE RISE AND FALL OF SUB-
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A. The Nineteenth-Century Vision
We can express the popular American attitudes toward the
available forms of residential life during the nineteenth century, es-
pecially after 1850, in terms of two sets of ideas:
owned (detached) house vs. leased apartment
suburban urban
family commerce
exclusion through isolation congestion/lack of privacy
(separateness as good)
Increasingly during the nineteenth century, popular writings
idealized residential life outside the city and, specifically, the single-
family dwelling.27 People associated city life with congestion, and
congestion connoted danger, disease, and loss of individual privacy.
Writers like Catherine Beecher,28 Andrew Jackson Downing,29 and
Calvert Vaux 3° romanticized the.values associated with semi-rural
living-harmonious family life, escape from the rigors of the busi-
ness world, personal tranquility, and uniqueness in housing and
landscape.3' These values, in turn, grew out of the rise of the cult of
domesticity and the segregation of the world of the family from the
world of work in popular consciousness throughout the first half of
the nineteenth century, congealing later in the current understand-
ing of the dichotomy between the public and private spheres.3 2
Central to realizing the benefits of suburban living was private
URBIA (1987); KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF
THE UNITED STATES (1985); JOHN STILGOE, BORDERLAND: ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
SUBURB, 1820-1939 (1988); MARC A. WEISS, THE RISE OF THE COMMUNITY BUILDERS:
THE AMERICAN REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY AND URBAN LAND PLANNING (1987); GWENDOLYN
WRIGHT, BUILDING THE DREAM: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF HOUSING IN AMERICA (1981). The
standard work linking the development of American residential life to technological
changes, particularly in transportation, is SAM BASS WARNER, STREETCAR SUBURBS: THE
PROCESS OF GROWTH IN BOSTON, 1870-1900 (1962).
Robert Fishman's Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia, supra, represents a
break with this instrumental tradition in urban historiography. He argues that Anglo-
American suburbanization was a cultural development, specifically, that it was the ex-
pression of the cultural values-domesticity, leisure, an artificial union with nature, and,
above all, exclusivity.
27 R. FISHMAN, supra note 26, at 50, 52, 58, 68-72.
28 See CATHERINE BEECHER, TREATISE ON DOMESTIC ECONOMY, FOR THE USE OF
YOUNG LADIES AT HOME AND AT SCHOOL (n.p. 1841).
29 See ANDREW JACKSON DOWNING, THE ARCHITECTURE OF COUNTRY HOUSES (1850)
(Da Capo Press Reprint ed. 1968); ADREW JACKSON DOWNING, RURAL ESSAYS (George
William Curtis ed. 1853).
30 See CALVERT VAUX, VILLAS AND COTTAGES (1857).
31 Lewis Mumford emphasizes this last benefit of suburban life in mid-nineteenth
century thought in LEWIS MUMFORD, THE CITY IN HISTORY: ITS ORIGINS, ITS TRANSFOR-
MATIONS, AND ITS PROSPECTS 485-86 (1961).
32 See, e.g., NANCY F. COT', THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: "WOMAN'S SPHERE" IN
NEW ENGLAND, 1780-1835 at 63-100 (1977); Francis E. Olsen, The Family and the Market
A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
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ownership of a single-family, detached house. As Kenneth Jackson
has stated, "[t]he single-family dwelling became the paragon of mid-
dle-class housing, the most visible symbol of having arrived at a
fixed place in society, the goal to which every decent family as-
pired." 33 It was not solely the architecture that mattered, but the
mode of ownership as well-individual ownership. Leasing pro-
duced rootlessness and what modem social theorists call social
alienation. Ownership of a detached house created the necessary
environment within which the individual could flourish. Indeed, the
isolated house came to represent the individual.34 Its separateness,
both spatially and legally,35 unambiguously expressed the dominant
social vision of individualism.
Perhaps the most important meaning that ownership of the de-
tached house signified was exclusion. The middle class increasingly
sought to escape from the social heterogeneity of urban life. The
detached dwelling in semi-rural settings represented living, as op-
posed to working, in an environment that excluded all of the disso-
nant elements of the city, i.e., the crowd. Exclusion, in other words,
required relative isolation.
B. The Mid-Twentieth Century Vision: Search for Community
By the middle of this century, popular attitudes concerning the
ideal forms of living arrangements had changed. The following
scheme captures the sense of our modem notions:
detached house vs. owned project unit
with shared areas
sense of alienation shared values
isolation/loss of exclusion through
community connectedness
Common unit developments reflect the strengthening of a
group mentality among homebuyers in the second half of the twen-
tieth century. The romance of life in the suburbs has diminished in
modem culture, or at least it has substantially changed. For many
people, the detached house has come to imply alienation from
33 K. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 50; see also G. WRIGHT, supra note 26, at 193-214.
34 K. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 52; see also Clare Cooper, The House as Symbol of the
Self, in DESIGNING FOR HUMAN BEHAVIOR: ARCHITECTURE AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
130-46 (1974).
35 In fact, as Kenneth Jackson points out, not all elements of nineteenth-century
society wanted to promote outright individual ownership. Business and political inter-
ests preferred mortgaged ownership, which is in a sense a form of shared ownership.
Mortgages, they hoped, would tie employees to their jobs and their towns. K.JACKSON,
supra note 26, at 51. The imprisoning effect of mortgages was precisely the focus of the
radical left's attack on individual ownership of houses. See FREDERICK ENGELS, THE ORI-
GIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE STATE 73-75 (1977).
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others, a fragmentation of one's life, one's identity.36
The conception of the detached house itself has changed in the
post-modern era. Various aspects of housing design reflect this
shift in popular consciousness. Common unit developments typi-
cally include commonly-owned areas, including recreational facili-
ties as well as open space and walkways. Certain planning features
also underscore the sense of groupness. For example, many post-
1960 developments situate houses together in a pattern that creates
a sense of insularity. As one planner recently observed, "People are
reacting against privatism. They want the feeling of a shared com-
munity." 37 Another commented, "The movement back to living in
neighborhoods is similar to the idea of belonging to a club. It gives
people an instant feeling of identity." 38 Common unit develop-
ments, including many condominiums and cooperatives, stress the
club-like quality of their living experience. They explicitly empha-
size their group character. It is no coincidence that developers ad-
vertise their projects as "communities" or "villages."
The conventional wisdom is that tax considerations have driven
the rise in popularity of condominiums. There is little doubt that
tax and other financial considerations have greatly influenced popu-
lar attitudes towards condominiums and similar forms of group
housing. But explaining the proliferation of common unit develop-
ments on the basis of tax considerations alone overlooks an impor-
tant aspect of the story of this form of residential life-the attraction
of many people to group living.
The self-image that common unit developments create in their
literature is one of connectedness-the resident as belonging to
something, rather than detached and alienated. The public mean-
ings of connectedness and isolation, however, have now reversed
their ninteenth-century meanings to a considerable extent. Con-
nectedness now commonly signifies what isolation did then with re-
spect to the detached single-family house, i.e., exclusion. The
comparison drawn in popular discourse between common unit de-
velopments and clubs represents not simply the availability of
shared facilities in common unit developments, but the association
of those developments with the deeper public meaning of club-the
sense of exclusion that results from the organization of social
36 Gwendolyn Wright has traced this shift to the 1960s: "[Pleople... recognized
that there had to be some middle ground between suburban sprawl and urban high-rise,
between isolation in the suburbs and anonymity in the cities. The architectural result
was a concept called cluster housing." G. WRIGHT, supra note 26, at 259.
37 Carol Vogel, Clustered for Leisure, N.Y. Times,June 28, 1987, § 6 (magazine), at 46
(quoting Jacqueline Leavitt, associate professor of urban planning at UCLA).
38 Id. at 46, 64 (Stan Eckstut, architect and urban planner, designed the master plan
for Battery Park City in Manhattan.).
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groups explicitly on the basis of discrete purposes and values shared
only by certain segments of society.
Recent cases reflect judicial awareness of the group character of
residential life in common unit developments. 39 The sense that
emerges from these cases is that courts regard these arrangements
as new forms of residency, fundamentally different from both tradi-
tional fee ownership of the detached house and apartment living.
Common unit developments represent attempts to infuse a social
experience of groupness into modem ownership of residential
property. Accepting that vision of common unit developments has
led some courts to accept various restrictions, including restraints
on alienation, as positive devices for creating and maintaining
groups. That is, the courts' sense of the novelty of this mode of
residential life has influenced their understanding of the special role
of property restrictions in creating and maintaining group identity.
Social groups are sometimes constituted, at least in part, by
their connection to land or other resources. 40 If a particular asset
constitutes a group, then the group must have some measure of
control over the transferability of that asset to maintain its very
existence. The group risks disintegration if it permits all of its mem-
bers freely to transfer their individual interest in relevant items of
property with no control by the group as a whole.
The ability of groups constituted by property to maintain their
existence does not require a communal form of ownership. 41 Main-
39 See, e.g., Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v. Dargeor, 119 Cal. App. 3d 670, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 136 (1981); White Egret Condominium v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979);
Seagate Condominium Ass'n v. Duffy, 330 So. 2d 484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Hidden
Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Franklin v.
Spadafore, 388 Mass. 764, 447 N.E.2d 1244 (1983).
40 The notion that property, whether in land or other forms, functions to define the
cultural identity of groups is an extension of the personality theory of property. The
most important recent scholar developing the personhood theory with respect to indi-
viduals is Margaret Jane Radin. See, e.g., Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987); Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV.
957 (1982). Less work has been done extending the theory to groups. For an early
attempt, see Note, Group Rights in Cultural Property: Justifying Strict Inalienability, 74 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1179 (1988) (authored by John Moustakas). More obvious examples of
property as a foundation of groups and the disastrous consequences upon group cohe-
siveness when group-foundational property is expropriated by conquest are provided by
the claims for reparations made in recent years by Native Alaskans and Native
Hawaiians. For discussions of the former, see Comment, Toward Consent and Cooperation:
Reconsidering the Political Status of Indian Nations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 507 (1987)
(authored by Rachel San Kronowitz, Joanne Lichtman, Steven Paul McSloy, and Mat-
thew G. Olsen); Note, American Indian Land Claims: Land Versus Money as a Remedy, 25 U.
FLA. L. REV. 308 (1973) (authored by Richard Nielson). See also Alaskan Native Claims
Settlement Act of 1971, 43 U.S.C. § 1601 (1982). On the latter, see Mari Matsuda, Look-
ing to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 368-
373 (1987).
41 Michael Taylor points out that "property rights economists tend to see only two
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taining the group's existence is compatible with individual owner-
ship, although not the classical liberal conception of individual
ownership. Basing group existence on property requires a form of
individual ownership in which individual control is sacrificed to the
group to the extent that individual control is inconsistent with main-
tenance of the group.42 But ownership, because it is a social prac-
tice, always involves some sacrifice of individual control in this
sense. It is only in the mythology of classical liberalism that owner-
ship is absolute.
Residential associations are a contemporary setting for this
group-constitutive role of property and of restrictions on property
use.43 Residential associations are the governance entities for terri-
torial groups that are constituted with respect to particular assets,
some of which are individually owned, others owned in common by
group members. In this sense, these property restrictions are tied
to group existence, for maintaining the character of the group re-
quires that the association be able to enforce these property restric-
tions. This interpretation of residential association restrictions has
guided the judicial reaction to recent challenges to these
restrictions.
II
THE LEGAL BACKGROUND: REGULATION OF RESIDENTIAL
ASSOCIATION RULES
In determining the validity of restrictions that residential as-
sociations have imposed on their members, courts have applied a
test of "reasonableness." Several commentators have objected to
this judicial practice, labelling it a form of "Lochnerian activism." 44
or three possibilities: open access and private property, to which is sometimes added
state ownership." Taylor goes on to distinguish group property from these alternatives.
He further points out that there is no reason why transaction costs should be greater in
the case of group property than in the case of individual property. MICHAEL TAYLOR,
THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION 28-29 (1987).
42 Such a "diluted" form of individual ownership will turn out to be the classical
liberal form of individual ownership if we treat the entire society as the relevant group.
Some measure of individual control simply has to be sacrificed to society, even in the
purest forms of liberal property. See KARL PoiANYi, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION
(1944); Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in NoMos XXIV:
ETHICS, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 3 (1982). The conception of property that was held by
several theorists in the classical republican tradition is one example of such a conception
of individual ownership existing within and subordinate to the group as a whole.
43 See JAMES GREVILLE AGARD POCOCK, VIRTUE, COMMERCE, AND HISTORY 103-23
(1985); JAMES GREVILLE AGARD POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 386-91, 423-67 (1975).
44 Ellickson, Cities, supra note 16, at 1526; see also Reichman, Servitudes Review, supra
note 22; NoteJudicial Review, supra note 22; Note, Rule of Law, supra note 22. Professor
Ellickson's criticism ofjudicial review of residential association rules as "Lochnerian" is
ironic. As Cass Sunstein has pointed out, Lochner's symbolic meaning is not judicial ac-
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They have interpreted the reasonableness standard as inviting re-
view of residential association restrictions for consistency with
norms that are exogenous to the development. Comparing the rea-
sonableness standard with the familiar constitutional test applied to
analogous public rules (i.e., whether the regulation is rationally re-
lated to a legitimate state interest), critics have argued that courts
are more demanding of private restraints than they are of public
regulations. Constitutional rationality review imposes minimal con-
straints on public government,45 requiring only a credible instru-
mental fit between the regulation and a legitimate internal goal of
the public agency. Why then, critics ask, should the standard of re-
view be more intrusive with respect to private governmental
regulations?
The character of judicial review of residential association re-
strictions under the reasonableness requirement is far less clear
than these critics recognize. There simply is no general pattern or
model that emerges from the cases applying the reasonableness
standard. While some decisions appear to involve substantive re-
view,46 courts in other cases have followed just the sort of inquiry
that critics of reasonableness review endorse, a minimalist review of
instrumental fit with the development's internal goals.47 Moreover,
even where courts apparently have evaluated a restraint's reasona-
bleness on the basis of exogenous social norms, they sometimes
have sustained the restriction. 48 Conversely, when courts have
struck down restrictions, claiming to confine their attention to the
development's own purposes rather than external social norms, the
actual basis of decision is usually uncertain because the develop-
ment's goals are expressed so broadly that it is virtually impossible
for a restriction not to fit within their scope. Minimal rationality re-
view under these circumstances is an empty gesture.
Another point overlooked by critics of the reasonableness stan-
dard is that the effect of the shift to a reasonableness test, however
tivism in the abstract, but protection of the existing distribution of wealth and entitle-
ments. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLuM. L. REv. 873, 875 (1987). In this
sense, it is Ellickson who is the Lochnerian, not the courts which strike down "unreason-
able" restrictions.
45 See generally Robert W. Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial
Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 1049 (1979).
46 See, e.g., Bernardo Villas Management Corp. Number Two v. Black, 190 Cal. App.
3d 153, 235 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1987); Gale v. York Center Community Coop., Inc., 21 111.
2d 86, 171 N.E.2d 30 (1960); Baum v. Ryerson Towers, 55 Misc. 2d 1045, 287 N.Y.S.2d
791 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Justice Court Mut. Hous. Coop., Inc. v. Sandow, 50 Misc. 2d 541,
270 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
47 See, e.g., Laguna Royal Owners Ass'n v. Darger, 119 Cal. App. 3d 670, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 136 (1981); Holleman v. Mission Trace Homeowners Ass'n, 556 S.W.2d 632 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1977).
48 E.g., York Center, 21 Ill. 2d 86, 171 N.E.2d 30.
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defined, may be precisely what they seek-to increase the likelihood
that residential association rules will be sustained. The reasonable-
ness standard replaces traditional common-law and statutory rules
governing restraints on alienation and land-use servitudes. Those
rules generally are hostile to restrictions on property transfer or
use. For example, common-law doctrine declares restraints on the
alienation of fee interests per se void: Assuming that this common-
law rule were otherwise applicable to residential association re-
straints on transfer of individual interests in common unit develop-
ments, then replacing that rule with the open-ended reasonableness
standard represents a shift toward a legal attitude that is substan-
tively more tolerant of such restrictions, even though it involves a
greater degree of explicit judicial discretion over the affairs of the
association.
It is unclear whether the reasonableness standard in fact signi-
fies such a change in attitude. The legal rule that would otherwise
apply to a given restriction in a residential association frequently is
uncertain. Residential association restrictions may take any one of a
number of different forms, including direct restraints on aliena-
tion,49 rights of pre-emption, 50 and property servitudes.51 More
often than not, the specific type of restriction involved is unclear, 52
thus making the applicable legal norm uncertain. Under the tradi-
tional structure of property rules, form, not practical effect, controls
a property restriction's validity. For example, at common law so-
called disabling restraints, provisions that purport to deny the trans-
ferability of an asset, are per se void as to freehold estates, 53 but per se
valid as to leasehold interests. 54 If a disabling restraint is imposed
on a condominium or cooperative ownership interest,55 it is unclear
49 See, e.g., Mowatt v. 1540 Lake Shore Drive Corp., 385 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1967)
(reasonableness requirement imposed); Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v. Darger, 119
Cal. App. 3d 670, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1981) (reasonableness requirement imposed);
Weisner v. 791 Park Ave. Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 426, 160 N.E.2d 720, 190 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1959)
(cooperative disabling restraint per se valid).
50 See, e.g., York Center, 21 Ill. 2d 86, 171 N.E.2d 30 (reasonableness requirement
imposed).
51 See, e.g., Franklin v. Spadafora, 388 Mass. 764, 447 N.E.2d 1244 (1983) (reasona-
bleness requirement imposed).
52 See infra note 60.
53 Restraints may be imposed on voluntary or involuntary alienation or both. The
validity of provisions restraining involuntary alienation (i.e., creditor access) but permit-
ting voluntary alienation is more controversial, particularly as to disabling restraints. See
6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.108 (James A. Casner ed. 1952).
54 See, e.g.,Jacobs v. KIawans, 225 Md. 147, 169 A.2d 677 (1961). Recently, several
courts have departed from the traditional doctrine that a lessor may restrain a lessee
from transferring her interest for any reason. They have imposed an obligation on les-
sors not to withhold consent to assign or sublease arbitrarily. E.g., Funk v. Funk, 102
Idaho 521, 633 P.2d 586 (1981).
55 See, e.g., 68 Beacon St., Inc. v. Sohier, 289 Mass. 354, 194 N.E. 303 (1935) (sus-
[Vol. 75:1
1989] GROUP AUTONOMY 15
which of these two rules would apply since condominium and coop-
erative housing interests share some of the characteristics of both
the traditional fee and leasehold estates. 56
Probably the more common forms of restrictions in modern
residential associations are preemption rights57 and servitudes. A
major issue in recent years has been whether the Rule Against Per-
petuities or the doctrines concerning direct restraints on alienation
should regulate preemption rights. A number of courts have held
that preemption rights, particularly when included in condominium
or cooperative agreements, are not subject to the Rule Against Per-
petuities but only to the doctrines on direct restraints on aliena-
tion.58 These courts have treated the choice as one between a fixed
Rule Against Perpetuities and an open-ended doctrine against un-
reasonable restraints on alienation. Other courts upholding condo-
tamining disabling restraint imposed on cooperative proprietary leasehold); Weisner v.
791 Park Ave. Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 426, 160 N.E.2d 720 (1959) (same); Penthouse Proper-
ties v. 1158 Fifth Ave., Inc., 256 A.D. 685, 11 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1939) (same).
56 See, e.g., Mowatt v. 1540 Lake Shore Drive Corp., 385 F.2d 137 (7th Cir. 1967)
(disabling restraint on cooperative housing development sustained under the reasona-
bleness test despite the fact that the "lease" was for a 99-year term). See generally Olin L.
Browder, Jr., Restraints on the Alienation of Condominium Units, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 231, 232
(noting that the factors that justify leasehold restraints seem to apply to condominim
owners).
57 Rights of preemption differ from options to purchase in that holders of preemp-
tions have the right to buy only if the owner decides to sell, while options are unilaterally
enforceable. That is, options obligate the owner of the property to sell at the optionee's
volition, not the owner's. Generally, options are subject to the durational requirement
of the Rule Against Perpetuities and are void if they can be exercised after the period of
lives in being at the creation of the option plus twenty-one years. They are not subject
to the doctrine concerning direct restraints on alienation, however. See, e.g., Certified
Corp. v. GTE Prods. Corp., 392 Mass. 821, 467 N.E.2d 1336 (1984). See generally OLIN
L. BROWDER, JR. & LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER, FAMILY PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS: FUTURE
INTERESTS 373-74 (3d ed. 1980) (further developing this analysis).
58 See, e.g., Cambridge Co. v. East Slope Inv. Corp., 700 P.2d 537 (Colo. 1985);
Anderson v. 50 E. 72nd St. Condominium, 129 Misc. 2d 295, 492 N.Y.S.2d 989 (1985)
(applying rule against unreasonable restraints to preemptive rights); see also Metropoli-
tan Transp. Auth. v. Bruken Realty Corp., 67 N.Y.2d 156, 492 N.E.2d 379, 501 N.Y.S.2d
306 (1986). What is really at stake in these cases is whether and in what contexts pre-
emption rights should be subject to a durational requirement. The Rule Against Perpe-
tuities imposes a strict durational limit on the validity of preemptions, while the flexible
standard of reasonableness enables courts to take context into account. In the context
of condominiums and cooperatives, a durational requirement would frustrate the associ-
ation's interest in maintaining control over its membership. This consideration does not
apply in other contexts, and under the reasonableness standard, courts can impose such
a requirement. Nevertheless, some recent cases not involving residential association
preemptions have held that the Rule Against Perpetuities applies to preemption rights,
even those that require merely an offer at a prevailing market rate, as opposed to a fixed
price, where the preemption has unlimited duration. See, e.g., Atchison v. City of Engle-
wood, 170 Colo. 295,463 P.2d 297 (1969); Ferrero Constr. Co. v. Dennis Rourke Corp.,
311 Md. 560, 536 A.2d 1137 (1988); Robroy Land Co. v. Prather, 24 Wash. App. 511,
601 P.2d 992 (1979), rev'd, 95 Wash. 2d 366 (1980). But see Shiver v. Benton, 251 Ga.
284, 304 S.E.2d 903 (1983).
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minium preemption rights as reasonable have assumed that the
traditional rules prohibiting direct restraints on alienation would
otherwise apply. 59
Many residential association restrictions take the form of a cov-
enant to comply with the by-laws of the development's residential
association. The by-laws almost invariably provide that owners may
not transfer their interests without the express prior approval of the
association. Some also restrict the owner's power to sell without
first offering the interest to the association. A provision of this latter
sort, of course, is a restraint on alienation, seemingly subject to the
strict prohibition. Nevertheless, courts in recent decisions have
tended simply to assume, without discussion, that a reasonableness
standard applies. 60
If the prior legal regime regulating these restrictions was more
or less one ofper se invalidity, then the apparent effect of the shift to
judicial "activism" under the reasonableness test is to increase the
likelihood that any given restriction will be sustained. Even if we
ignore (as we should not) critiques that have deconstructed the dis-
tinction between rules and standards, "crystals" and "mud," 6 1 and
concede for the sake of argument that the reasonableness standard
requires more judicial discretion than do the traditional per se rules,
and that courts sometimes exercise that greater discretion to strike
down a restriction, it still remains the case that the reasonableness
standard explicitly leaves open the possibility that particular restric-
tions may be sustained. That possibility does not explicitly exist
under per se rules prohibiting restraints on alienation, although we
need to recall the point that in practice crystals present as much
discretion for judges as mud. Here, as elsewhere, the open-ended
reasonableness standard is overtly more forgiving than its formal
59 See, e.g., Chianese v. Culley, 397 F. Supp. 1344, 1345-46 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Gale v.
York Center Community Coop., 21 111. 2d 86, 171 N.E.2d 30 (1960). The courts sus-
taining condominium and cooperative preemptions generally have done so if the pre-
emption was limited in duration and gave the holder the right to buy at the market price
rather than a fixed price. The Restatement (Second) of Property similarly provides that
preemptions reasonable in duration and price are not restraints on alienation but that
other preemptions are subject to the rules regulating direct restraints on alienation. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (Donative Transfers) § 4.4 (1983).
60 See, e.g., Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v. Darger, 119 Cal. App. 3d 670, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 136 (1981); Franklin v. Spadafora, 388 Mass. 764, 447 N.E.2d 1244 (1983).
The failure of courts to distinguish among the various forms of restrictions may
reflect their recognition of the fact that developers themselves pay no attention to the
traditional legal categories. The industry language refers collectively to "CC&Rs"-
conditions, covenants, and restrictions. See Weiss & Watts, Community Builders and Com-
munity Associations: The Role of Large-Scale Developers in Private Residential Governance, in RES-
IDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM 7 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, forthcoming 1989).
61 The metaphor of "crystal" and "mud" is developed in Carol M. Rose, Crystals and
Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988).
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alternative. 62 In this sense, the reasonableness standard is better
suited to the critics' objective of maximizing the validity of privately-
created property restrictions. Thus advocates of association restric-
tions should applaud the shift from "deference" to "activism."
They do not do so because their real objection is not merely to
judicial activism in the sense of the exercise of discretion, but to
legal interference in the affairs of private groups. The alternative to
reasonableness review that critics ofjudicial activism want is not the
traditional per se rules prohibiting restraints, but the reverse of those
rules. They want a rule creating a strong presumption of validity, if
not ofper se validity, of association restrictions. 63 Such a rule would
mean both judicial passivity and substantive validity, but passivity in
this sense is valued only because it ensures validity. The rhetoric
about "Lochnerian activism" should not obscure the point that the
real thrust of the doctrinal regime that these critics prefer is strong
group autonomy. The controversy over judicial review of residen-
tial association rules under the reasonableness standard, then, only
opens the door to deeper questions concerning the normative basis
and limits of group autonomy.
III
THEORIES OF GROUPS AND GROUP AUTONOMY
The task of developing and contrasting theories of voluntary
groups64 for purposes of evaluating arguments for group autonomy
from legal intervention is complicated by the fact that the group
perspective is largely absent from legal discourse. Legal scholarship
has not provided a rich conceptual study of social groups. In recent
years, however, several writers have suggested normative reasons
62 See generally MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15-63 (1987);
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685
(1976).
63 Epstein, for example, concedes that exceptions to his principle of individual free-
dom to impose restrictions on transfer are needed to control externalities, such as over-
consumption of common pool resources. See Epstein, Why Restrain, supra note 23, at
973-88. Moreover, both Epstein and Ellickson concede that residential association re-
strictions that discriminate on the basis of race are and should be void. See Richard
Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906, 918-19 (1988) (hereinafter
Epstein, Covenants]; Ellickson, Cities, supra note 16, at 1528. I discuss their failure to
reconcile this concession to legal interference with their commitment to contractarian-
ism in Part IV. See infra text accompanying note 138.
64 Legal economists and other commentators who are committed to notions of pri-
vate ordering classify all social groups as either voluntary or involuntary. See, e.g., Ellick-
son, Cities, supra note 16; Epstein, Covenants, supra note 63. They draw no distinction
among voluntary groups, supposing that private choice is the exclusive basis for all vol-
untary groups. An important objective of this Article is to provide a richer understand-
ing of "voluntariness" than that provided by the strictly contractual conception of
groups.
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for recognizing the notions of group rights and group autonomy as
distinct from individual rights and individual autonomy. 65 Ronald
Garet, for example, has argued that "[g]roups have a fundamental
right to respect for their communality, just as persons have a funda-
mental right to respect for their personhood." 66 The group claim to
respect for their communality means that groups should have the
power to organize themselves as they see fit and to enact and en-
force internal rules that are necessary for their existence-that is, to
maintain the existence of the group. This notion of group auton-
omy might provide a justification for restrictions imposed on resi-
dential association members in the use and disposition of their
property, including restraints on transferability of owner property.
The little legal writing that does focus on groups, for the most part,
has not explicitly developed alternative conceptions of groups.67
Various writings in economics, social theory, political science, and
philosophy, however, have particularly strong relevance to legal
thought and practice regarding groups, and I will draw on work in
these disciplines to sketch two theories of groups and two lines of
justification for group autonomy.
Two distinct theories have emerged in the literature on groups.
One derives from the theory of public choice. Synthesizing
economic theory and political science, it uses microeconomic con-
cepts to explain, predict, and prescribe political behavior. 68 Public
choice theory essentially is a variation on the twentieth-century the-
ory of pluralist politics. 69 As such, it explicitly focuses on the role of
groups in society, for pluralists posit that the key to understanding
society is in the interplay between social groups. 70 Public choice
theorists have developed a clear and distinct positive conception of
social groups, and this conception in recent years has influenced
many legal scholars, particularly those engaged in law-and-econom-
ics work.
The other theory of social groups is communitarianism. This
theory is harder to describe because it is not as well-defined as pub-
lic choice theory. To some extent, the communitarian theory of
groups has developed in reaction to pluralist/public choice theory,
65 See, e.g., Frug, supra note 8; Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights
of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001 (1983).
66 Garet, supra note 65, at 1017.
67 A notable exception is Garet, supra note 65.
68 See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 6; DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC
CHOICE (1979).
69 See, e.g., ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1949); R. DAHL,
supra note 5; ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? (1961); D. TRUMAN, supra note 5; Green-
stone, supra note 5.
70 See A. BENTLEY, supra note 69, at 208-09.
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so it perhaps is easier to describe it by contrasting it with the public
choice conception.
A. Two Theories of Groups
1. The Public Choice/Pluralist Theory
It seems paradoxical at first blush to discuss a conception of
social groups held by public choice theory. 71 A basic premise of that
theory, after all, is that the individual is the basic unit of all forms of
social organization. All other modes of social organization are
reduceable to individuals. James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock re-
fer to this premise as "methodological individualism." 72 They con-
trast that notion with individualism as a norm for organizing social
action. Buchanan and Tullock claim that their analysis carries no
normative baggage because methodological individualism merely
postulates that society makes political choices through the process
of individuals choosing among available alternatives. The value
scheme that guides individuals in making these choices-narrow
egoism, altruism, or whatever-supposedly is irrelevant to the meth-
odological commitment to individualism.
At the same time, however, public choice theory's methodology
rejects certain other conceptions of society and state. Specifically, it
implicitly rejects organic social and political theories, including ver-
sions such as that developed by Hegel, 73 and more recently, by Ro-
berto Unger.74 Notions of the general will or the public interest, in
71 See Drucilla L. Cornell, Book Review, In Union: A Critical Review of Toward a Per-
fected State, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1089 (1987). Other writers recently have argued that this
contrast is overdrawn, and that liberalism can be reconstructed in ways that correct its
communitarian defects while preserving its core elements. Nancy Rosenblum, for exam-
ple, has described three paths for recasting liberalism in a communitarian mold. See
NANCY ROSENBLUM, ANOTHER LIBERALISM: ROMANTICISM AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF
LIBERAL THOUGHT 152-86 (1987). Nevertheless, it is quite clear that liberals who do
acknowledge the importance of community are willing to take community only so far.
This is evident, for example, in several recent articles by John Rawls. Rawls distin-
guishes between the classical republican conception of the good and that held in the
tradition of civic humanism. While viewing republicanism as consistent with liberalism
insofar as it seeks to promote political participation "as itself one form of good among
others," Rawls regards civic humanism as inconsistent with liberalism because civic hu-
manism views "political participation in democratic politics ... as the privileged locus of
the good life." John Rawls, The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
251, 273 (1988); see also John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OxFoRDJ. LEG.
STUD. 1 (1987);John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 9J. PHIL. 515 (1980).
72 J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 6, at vi; see Jon Elster, Introduction, in RA-
TIONAL CHOICE 1, 3-4 (Jon Elster ed. 1986) (methodological individualism denies that
there are collective desires or collective beliefs).
73 See G.W.F. HEGEL, SCIENCE OF LOGIC 761-77 (A. Miller trans. 1969); see also
G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T. Knox trans. 1942).
74 See R. UNGER, supra note 8. As several (but not all) writers have noticed, Unger's
later work, notably his recent multi-volume Politics, departs in several crucial senses from
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any sense other than mere aggregations of individual choices, have
no room in public choice theory. 75
At this point, we can begin to see the conception of social
groups that public choice theorists hold. All modes of social organi-
zation are invariably nothing more than collections of individuals.
Public choice theory follows the premise of early twentieth-century
political pluralists that groups are simply the organizational form
through which individuals express their self-interest.7 6 Individuals
choose to join with others, forming social groups, in order to pursue
certain objectives. As individuals pursue a variety of goals both over
the course of their lives and at any one time, they belong to several
groups simultaneously. 77
The crucial aspect of this public choice/pluralist conception of
groups is the criterion for membership. Public choice theory posits
that membership in any voluntary group is based exclusively on in-
the communitarian project of Knowledge and Politics. See, e.g., Cornell West, CLS and a
Liberal Critic, 97 YALE LJ. 757, 758 (1988) (identifying Unger's epistemological shift
from a foundationalist perspective to an anti-essentialist, or historicist, stance). Unger
first shifted his epistemological assumptions in his essay, The Critical Legal Studies Move-
ment, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983), and then in his book, PASSIONS (1984). Accompany-
ing the epistemological shift was a movement away from the theory of organic groups,
developed at length in Knowledge and Politics, toward a "superliberal" theory of "empow-
ered democracy." See ROBERTO M. UNGER, PoLrrcs: A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL
THEORY (1987). Politics is a profoundly Romantic text, as some reviewers have empha-
sized, though with substantially different reactions. Compare Richard Rorty, Unger, Cas-
toriadis, and the Romance of a National Future, 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 335 (1988) with Stephen
Holmes, The Professor of Smashing The Preposterous Political Romanticism of Roberto Unger,
NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 19, 1987, at 30. Its rhetoric is absorbed with images of "self-asser-
tion" and "context-smashing." Those images appeal to the strand of Romantic thought
that stresses "individuality, spontaneity, and expressivity." N. ROSENBLUM, supra note
71, at 2. For a forceful articulation of this interpretation of Romantic thought, see
Steven H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance (May 12, 1989)
(forthcoming Harvard University Press). This is not to suggest that Romanticism and
communitarianism are mutually antagonistic-far from it. For one thing, a historically
important strand of Romantic thought was associated with an organic conception of so-
ciety (see PETER THORSLEVE, ROMANTIC CONTRARIES: FREEDOM VERSUS DESTINY 84-125
(1984)), and from the end of the eighteenth century to the present time that conception
has commonly been associated with collectivist notions of community. See Steven Ton-
sor, The Conservative Origins of Collectivism, in LIBERTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 224 (R. Cun-
ningham ed. 1979). Moreover, as Nancy Rosenblum's recent book, Another Liberalism
indicates, contemporary theorists have appealed to Romantic sensibilities to push liber-
alism in a communitarian direction. N. ROSENBLUM, supra note 71. Knowledge and Politics
reverses this vector between liberalism (or, better, individualism) and communitarianism
by pushing community in the direction of self-assertion. R. UNGER, supra note 8.
75 There are some exceptions to pluralist theory's rejection of the public interest as
a meaningful concept. Perhaps the most notable-and most emphatic-of the pluralists
who affirm the concept is Grant McConnell. See, e.g., GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE
POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 364-68 (1966). See also Greenstone, supra note 5, at
275-77.
76 See, e.g., A. BENTLEY, supra note 69; D. TRUMAN, supra note 5.
77 See A. BENTLEY, supra note 69, at 208-09.
[Vol. 75:1
GROUP AUTONOMY
dividual choice. 78 Voluntary groups are contractarian in the sense
that they are created by the express or implied mutual agreement of
all members to associate with each other. Individual welfare is what
motivates persons to associate with each other. Because of this ex-
clusively contractarian model, pluralist and public choice writers pay
no attention to the character or quality of social relationships within
groups. Their model distinguishes only between consensual and co-
ercive groups.
Although pluralist democratic public choice theory focuses on
interest groups-that is, economic and political groups-its analysis
applies to social groups that are not motivated simply by shared
preferences on a limited number of issues. Expanding the public
choice model into the broader social sphere, pluralist/public choice
theory holds that all voluntary social groups essentially are volun-
tary associations. Clear examples of voluntary associations are
dubs, fraternal organizations, religious societies, and the like.
Membership in voluntary associations usually is determined in ex-
plicitly contractual ways. Individual members choose to he with
each other for individual, instrumental reasons when they happen to
hold what Charles Taylor calls "convergent," as opposed to
"shared" goods. 79 Value is infused into the group only transaction-
ally. The good for human individuals, and therefore for social
groups, is properly defined by preferences, which are radically dis-
tinguished from substantive conceptions of the good. Voluntary as-
sociations, like public choice theory's political interest groups, come
into being when individuals calculate that the costs of acting in con-
cert with others to pursue some convergent good are lower than the
costs of pursuing that goal individually.80 A plurality of voluntary
associations results as individuals pursue their own conceptions of
the good in concert with others who share the same conception.
The aspect of the public choice/pluralist theory that needs to
be emphasized here is its belief that all voluntary social groups are
reduceable to collections of individuals. The corollary of this reduc-
tionist premise is that there is only one type of voluntary group,
namely, the associative group.
2. The Communitarian Theory
Interest in community, as an ideal and as an institution, has in-
78 For a recent judicial example of this view, see ChiefJustice Rehnquist's opinion
in Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S.
480 (1985) (analyzing political action committees in consensual terms). Gerald Frug
recently has critiqued Rehnquist's consensualism in Gerald Frug, Argument as Character,
40 STAN. L. REv. 869, 900-07 (1988).
79 C. TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 96.
80 J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 57-62.
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creased dramatically in the past several years. Communitarian theo-
ries have developed on at least two different levels. First, in
normative political and moral theory, communitarian writers have
focused on community as a regulative ideal. Their interest is in de-
veloping an alternative political and moral vision to that of atomist
individualists,81 like public choice theorists, whose preoccupation
with individual autonomy leads them to develop only a thin concep-
tion of community, when they focus on community at all.
The second level at which modern writers have discussed com-
munity is social theory. At this level, scholars focus on community
as an institution rather than as a concept or an ideal. The concern
here is with the conditions under which community as a norm can
be or has been realized as a concrete social practice and experience.
While distinct from each other, these two levels are intimately
related, and scholarship at one level informs scholarship at the
other. Social theories that inquire about the conditions under which
the ideal of community can be or has been realized must draw on
some normative theory that elaborates communitarian conceptions
of the self, the polity, and the just. Conversely, in elaborating com-
munity as a regulative ideal, normative political theory cannot ig-
nore questions about the concrete conditions under which that ideal
can be realized as a social praxis.8 2 While the focus of this Article is
directed primarily at social theory, we still need first to sketch an
account of the moral vision that communitarians have described in
recent years.
It is notoriously difficult to articulate exactly what ideas sepa-
rate moral individualists from contemporary communitarians. At
the risk of oversimplication, however, one can say that much of their
dispute concerns the structure of moral justification. Moral individ-
81 Charles Taylor has defined "atomism" as that set of doctrines which express "a
vision of society as in some sense constituted by individuals for the fulfilment of ends
which were primarily individual." C. TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 187. The central doctrine
in the tradition of political atomism is what Taylor calls "the primacy of rights," i.e., the
view that accepts "a principle ascribing rights to men as binding unconditionally...
[b]ut... do[es] not accept as similarly unconditional a principle of belonging or obliga-
tion." Id. at 188. In the discussion that follows, I will use the term "individualists" to
refer to writers who hold that view.
82 See, e.g., MICHAEL TAYLOR, COMMUNITY, ANARCHY, AND LIBERTY (1982).
The discussion of scale in recent communitarian writings indicates that communi-
tarian theorists have not ignored questions about the requisite social conditions for real-
ization of community. See, e.g., B. BARBER, supra note 8, at 245-51, 267-73; R. UNGER,
supra note 8, at 221, 262-67. This concern can be connected with the prominent place
that the problem of scale had in eighteenth century American republican discourse. See
BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 281-82, 288
(1967); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 at
499-506, 527 (1969); MortonJ. Horwitz, The Warren Court: Rediscovering the Link between
Law and Culture, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 450, 453 (1988).
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ualism ordinarily asserts that the ultimate basis for claims that an
action is right or a state of affairs good "is always some normative
premise about autonomous individuals or their preferences or
choices." 83 Much recent communitarian moral theory attempts to
establish that autonomous individuals are not the sole, or even a
main, source of obligation and value. Rather, it posits that the main
sources of obligation and value are collective social entities. Com-
munitarians have argued for shifting the individualist's normative
priority on the basis of certain claims about the relationship be-
tween self and society. These claims all converge on the denial of
the individual's independence from society, but it is not always clear
whether the dependency is understood in a causal, conceptual, or
ontological sense.8 4 For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that
moral communitarians understand each person's identity to be inex-
tricably connected, in some sense, not only with one or more dis-
crete groups, but with society as a whole. Communitarians deny
that the self is autonomous. Rather, they conceive of a person's
community as inextricably connected with that person's identity.
Community is related to the self in a constitutive sense.8 5
This conception of the self, which sees individuals constitutively
connected to society, leads communitarians to define the well-or-
dered society, in which individuals are enabled fully to realize their
own identities, as a community.8 6 A society which took the form of a
confederation of discrete social unions would perpetuate the prob-
lem of atomism by substituting discrete groups for individuals in the
theory of social organization. In such a non-communitarian society,
groups would deal with each other in the same manner as individu-
alists imagine people behave toward each other-instrumentally and
always with a certain stance of reserve. Individuals within communi-
tarian groups, in turn, would retain the same detachment toward
members of other groups, frustrating the ideal of community itself.
Realizing that ideal requires that societies strive to create them-
selves as communities. The question, then, becomes what institu-
tional arrangements are required for societies to move toward that
ideal.87
83 George Sher, Three Grades of Social Involvement, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 133, 136
(1989).
84 For a discussion that identifies and critiques these separate claims, see id.
85 C. TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 8.
86 M. SANDEL, supra note 8, at 150; see also B. BARBER, supra note 8, at 213-60 (devel-
oping a dialectical conception of the relationship between the self and the community).
87 See M. SANDEL, supra note 8, at 173. Sandel explicitly acknowledges the funda-
mental importance of the question of institutions in a normative theory of community.
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3. Community and Social Institutions
Since the middle of this century, an evolutionary model of so-
cial change and theory of society has dominated American social
theory.88 According to the social change model, twentieth-century
urbanization and social mobility have so transformed the character
of social relations within the United States that community as a so-
cial phenomenon has disappeared. The death-of-community thesis
is based on a territorialist conception of community.89 Modernity
has destroyed the physical conditions under which the intimate rela-
tionships that characterize communities may develop. As a result
voluntary associations, in which solidarity is based on transitory con-
vergences of instrumental objectives, have replaced community as
the dominant mode of group life in modern America.
Talcott Parsons and Louis Wirth, the principle architects of this
theory, expressed the transformation in terms of T6nnies' famous
contrast between gemeinschaft and gesellshaft,90 that is, intimate group
solidarity and impersonal social aggregation.9' Following Trnnies,
Parsons and Wirth associated gemeinschaft with neighborhood, vil-
lage, and small town life, and gesellshaft with urban life. Parsons de-
scribed social relations in urban environments, which
demographically have replaced village and small town life, in terms
of his famous "pattern variables": "neutrality" rather than "affectiv-
ity," "universalism" rather than "particularism," "achievement"
rather than "ascription," and "specificity" rather than "diffuse-
ness." 92 He claimed that this model of social change and its territo-
rial conception of community were scientifically and logically
deduced from the structure of society itself.
Parsons's death-of-community thesis not only has dominated
American sociological discussions of community, but also has influ-
enced American historiography. Historians have borrowed both the
social change model and the territorial conception of community,
uncritically assuming the validity of both.9 3 They, like Parsons and
88 For a brief introduction to this Durkheimian tradition of sociology and anthro-
pology, widely-known as the "Chicago school," see ANTHONY P. COHEN, THE SYMBOLIC
CONSTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY 21-38 (1985).
89 See THOMAS BENDER, COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA 15-43 (1978).
90 FERDINAND T6NNIES, COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY 33, 64, 65 (1963).
91 See TALCOTr PARSONS & EDWARD A. SHILS, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF AC-
TION (1962); TALCOTr PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM (1951); Talcott Parsons, Robert F.
Bales & Edward A. Shils, Working Papers, in THE THEORY OF ACTION (1953) [hereinafter
Working Papers]; Louis Wirth, Urbanism as a Way of Life, 44 AM.J. Soc. 1 (1938), reprinted in
Louis WIRTH ON CITIES AND SOCIAL LIFE 60 (Albert J. Reiss, Jr. ed. 1964).
92 See Working Papers, supra note 91.
93 See, e.g., CYRIL EDWIN BLACK, THE DYNAMICS OF MODERNIZATION: A STUDY IN
COMPARATIVE HISTORY (1967); RICHARD D. BROWN, MODERNIZATION: THE TRANSFORMA-
TION OF AMERICAN LIFE 1600-1865 (1976); Louis Galambos, Parsonian Sociology and Post-
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Wirth, have identified community exclusively with locality, specifi-
cally with small-town life. From this association, they have devel-
oped a linear model of the historical development of community
that supplements and validates the ideal types model of social
change. The shift from rural to urban life, beginning in the late
nineteenth century, was not simply accompanied by the decline of
community in America; it caused it. The ultimate effect of this histo-
riography is to support not only the Parsonian thesis, but, more im-
portantly, the pluralist view that voluntary group life in modem
America is definable only in contractarian terms with the voluntary
association as the paradigm.
Within the past several years, a very different conception of
community has emerged in historical writing-one that challenges
the Parsons-Wirth assumption regarding the conditions and institu-
tional arrangements required for the existence of community. 94
This emerging conception shifts the focus of attention from the ter-
ritorial context of community to the quality of social relationships
within groups. That is, it locates community, both as a concept and
as a social practice, in a particular kind of social experience rather
than in a particular territorial environment. 95 According to this ex-
periential conception, community is a network of social relation-
ships marked by mutuality and reciprocity.9 6 There is a sense of
Progressive History, 50 Soc. ScI. Q. 25 (1969). Thomas Bender's excellent book, COMMU-
NITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA, initiated an important revision of this historiogra-
phy. See T. BENDER, supra note 89.
94 See, e.g., T. BENDER, supra note 89; LAURENCE VEYSEY, THE COMMUNAL EXPERI-
ENCE: ANARCHIST AND MYSTICAL COMMUNITIES IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (1973).
95 See, e.g., T. BENDER, supra note 89; L. VEYSEY, supra note 94.
96 See T. BENDER, supra note 89, at 122-28, 143-49; see also Drucilla L. Cornell, Two
Lectures on the Normative Dimensions of Community in the Law, 54 TENN. L. REV. 327, 330-32,
340-41 (1987). Unlike most communitarian political and moral theorists (including
Drucilla Cornell, Charles Taylor, Benjamin Barber, and Michael Sandel), Bender distin-
guishes between community and commonweal as a basis for political order. "A com-
monwealth," he states, "is based upon shared public ideals, rather than upon
acquaintance or affection." T. BENDER, supra note 89, at 148. His distinction, however,
rests upon the sort of sentimentalized conception of community that Burkean com-
munitarians like Robert Nisbet hold. According to Nisbet, communities are held to-
gether by "affection, friendship, prestige, [and] recognition" and are strengthened by
"work, love, prayer, and devotion to freedom and order." ROBERT A. NISBET, THE
QUEST FOR COMMUNITY 50 (1953). As Barber indicates, this conception fails to resolve
the fundamental problem facing all communitarians: reconciling community with the
free self. It commits what Barber calls "the fallacy of organicism, presupposing that a
community represents none of the characteristics of its constituent parts." B. BARBER,
supra note 8, at 231. By contrast, left communitarians conceive of community not in
terms of intimate, face-to-face relations, but in terms of what Drucilla Cornell calls "rela-
tions of reciprocal symmetry." Cornell, supra, at 330-31, 340-41. Reciprocity is not
identical to liberal formal equality. The latter focuses on vertical relations between state
and citizen. Reciprocity focuses on horizontal relations among citizens. Unlike liberal
equality, reciprocity cannot be realized through actions by the state. Rather, it is real-
ized only as relations among citizens shift from impersonal abstraction to empathetic
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sharing among members of communities, which gives rise to a fur-
ther experience that is characteristic of communities, the experience
of belonging.
Two important consequences follow from this experiential con-
ception of community. First, by uncoupling community from village
and small-town society, it enables communitarians to refute the
death-of-community thesis. Second, by focusing attention on the
quality of social relationships rather than their intentional or non-
intentional character, it permits communitarians to distinguish, as
public-choice theorists do not, between different types of inten-
tional groups. 97
Communitarians recognize a distinction between two sorts of
intentional groups: voluntary associations and communities. 98 Un-
like public choice theorists, who distinguish only between inten-
tional and ascriptive (or non-intentional) groups, they focus not
only on the basis of membership, but also on the character and qual-
ity of relationships among members of groups. Indeed, communi-
tarian group theorists do not sharply distinguish between these
factors. Individuals become members of voluntary associations ex-
clusively through contract, and they do so for instrumental pur-
poses. The sense of detachment within voluntary associations
makes it appropriate to characterize them as mere aggregations of
self-seeking individuals. By contrast, members of communities are
drawn together by shared visions that constitute for each of them
their personal identity. Although at a formal level communities may
be created intially through contract, they neither are created nor
maintained strictly by contract. Within intentional communities, in-
dividuals participate in group life out of a sense of belonging. The
community expresses their very self identity.
The distinction between voluntary associations and communi-
ties is not strictly categorical. In practice, groups commonly have
characteristics of both so that categorizing them as one or the other
sometimes is difficult. Similarly, a group's character can change
over time, beginning as a voluntary association but evolving into a
community or vice versa. For communitarians, the crucial question
is whether social relationships within the group are based on more
than an instrumental convergence of individual ends-on reciprocal
empathy.
imagination. Defined according to the conception of reciprocally symmetrical relations,
community as a basis for political order is not distinct from commonweal or the civic
humanist notion of participatory democracy.
97 See B. BARBER, supra note 8, at 217-33.
98 See, e.g., id. at 213-33; PAUL WEiss, TOWARD A PERFECTED STATE 19, 24 (1986);
Cornell, supra note 71.
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Public choice theorists generally suppose that the distinction
between voluntary associations and communities translates into the
distinction between intentional and non-intentional groups. Com-
munitarian theorists concede that there is a dimension of choiceless-
ness in communities, but they deny that these two types of groups
can be reduced to the distinction between intentional and non-in-
tentional groups. A couple of examples demonstrate the weakness
of a distinction based on intentionality. The family is one.9 9 It is, of
course, difficult to analyze families in contractarian terms,10 0 but it
also is misleading to characterize family membership as exclusively
involuntary. Ordinary conceptions of the family include, for exam-
ple, persons related by marriage, adoption, and other non-biologi-
cal means. Thus, while individuals usually are born into families,
family membership has a mixture of voluntary and involuntary
sources.
Looking beyond the family, there are other examples of com-
munities that are even more obviously intentional. The example
that I want to use here, because it is also a true residential commu-
nity, is a monastery.
Monasteries are ascriptive groups in the sense that their mem-
bers feel deeply involved with them. In fact, monks have expressed
their experience as feeling incomplete or totally unfulfilled until
they joined their order.101 Participation in the life of the monastic
group is essential to the realization of their very self identity. Their
need to live within the monastic community is so strong that the act
ofjoining the monastery, as individual monks have experienced it, is
an act of choicelessness. They have felt that they were, in a
profound sense, born monks. 10 2
At the same time, the decision to join a monastery is deliberate
and not compelled, at least not from external sources. Membership
within a monastery has a very different basis from, say, that of a
prison, which is a particularly clear example of an involuntary
group. Affective ties draw together individuals within ascriptive
groups, but choice still plays an important role in their formation
and maintenance.
99 See, e.g., STANLEY I. BENN & RICHARD S. PETERS, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL
THOUGHT: SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE DEMOCRATIC STATE 286-89 (1959); ROBERT A.
NISBET, THE SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITION 47-48 (1966).
100 For an example of an attempt to do just that, however, see GARY S. BECKER, THE
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976). See also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 101-18 (2d ed. 1977) ("The marital relationship is fundamen-
tally contractual in character.").
101 The most powerful account of this experience is Thomas Merton's autobiogra-
phy, THE SEVEN STOREY MOUNTAIN (1948).
102 See id.
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The important point to bear in mind about the communitarian
theory of groups is the very fact that it recognizes the distinction
between two types of intentional groups-contractarian (i.e., volun-
tary associations) and non-contractarian (i.e., communities) groups.
Its refusal to reduce all voluntary social groups to a contractarian
basis is what distinguishes it from the public choice theory of
groups. In this sense, then, the communitarian theory is, ironically,
more pluralist than the nominally pluralist public choice theory.
B. Two Theories of Group Autonomy
Different normative arguments-instrumental and non-instru-
mental-for the freedom of social groups to regulate their own af-
fairs with little or no collective or legal intervention follow from the
communitarian and pluralist/public choice conceptions of social
groups. It is more accurate to consider each of these two theories as
clusters of normative arguments, for important differences exist
within both, but especially within what I have lumped together as
pluralist.
While pluralist theory traditionally has included both instru-
mental and non-instrumental arguments for group autonomy, pub-
lic-choice arguments are exclusively instrumental. One strand of
pluralist theory argues for group autonomy on the basis of a non-
instrument conception of the freedom of association principle. The
right of individuals freely to associate with each other implies, ac-
cording to this strand, that they are free to establish whatever terms
or conditions for their relationships they wish. So long as those
conditions were freely agreed upon, they should be fully enforcea-
ble, save that individuals should always be free to leave associa-
tions. 03 In effect, then, the associational autonomy principle is
simply an extension of the non-instrumental principle of freedom of
contract. 1
04
More commonly perhaps, pluralist and public choice theorists
have argued that the presence of diverse groups within society pro-
motes general social welfare in various ways, some quite vaguely ex-
pressed. 0 5 Pluralist writings articulate two lines of argument that
define a political conception of welfare. First, the proliferation of
diverse voluntary groups in society is a way of dividing power
outside of government to limit the coerciveness of centralized
103 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 299-306 (1974).
104 See infra text accompanying notes 127-37.
105 See, e.g., Zechariah Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV.
L. REV. 993, 1027 (1930) ("The health of society will usually be promoted if the groups
within it which serve the industrial, mental, and spiritual needs of citizens are genuinely
alive. Like individuals, they will usually do most for the community if they are free to
determine their own lives for the present and the future.").
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power within government. Michael Walzer, for example, argues
that "[tihe citizen is safer, it seems to me, in his groups, safer from
bureaucratic neglect or abuse, safer also . . . from social
oppression."1 0 6
Second, empowering groups multiplies opportunities for par-
ticipation in the political process. Pluralists value increased partici-
pation within group life both because it may enhance participation
within public life and because it promotes personal development
and self-realization.10 7 Robert Dahl's early work on pluralism, for
example, while acknowledging that power among social groups is
itself unevenly distributed, nevertheless concluded that active
groups help to assure that all individuals have some access to the
political decision making process. That achievement, Dahl ob-
served, is "no mean thing in a political system."108
Public choice theorists define social welfare in economic (i.e.,
wealth-maximizing), rather than political terms, although many of
these writers see the two aspects of social welfare as mutually rein-
forcing.10 9 Groups provide individuals with certain goods or serv-
ices, and the existence of multiple, diverse groups in a society means
that competition among groups will lead them to provide any given
good or service efficiently.
Applying this general analysis to residential groups, Robert El-
lickson has argued that residential associations are able to supply
quasi-public goods, such as parks or security services, more effi-
ciently than cities. Ellickson draws upon the model of municipal
government competition developed by Charles Tiebout. 1 0 Tiebout
conceptualized municipalities as competing with each other in a
market for residents. Municipalities try to attract residents by offer-
ing an appealing package of services and public financing programs.
106 MICHAEL WALZER, OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS ON DISOBEDIENCE, WAR, AND CITIZEN-
SHIP 224 (1970). David Nicholls has lucidly articulated the argument for group auton-
omy in this way:
A free society, as opposed to totalitarianism, is characterized, and is
protected, by the existence of semi-autonomous groups with overlapping
membership; there is thus no single centre of power, no monolithic body,
attempting to impose upon the country some total way of life, but rather
a benevolent umpire ensuring that all groups are able to have a foot in
the political door.
DAVID NICHOLLS, THREE VARIETIES OF PLURALISM 25 (1974).
107 As Nancy Rosenblum has observed, pluralism's recognition of self-realization
provides the basis for a reconciliation of pluralism and communitarianism. See N. Ro-
SENBLUM, supra note 71, at 125-51. I discuss the role of pluralism in modem communi-
tarian thought in Part V infra.
108 R. DAHL, supra note 5, at 150.
109 See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 6; ANTHONv DOWNS, AN Eco-
NOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1956).
110 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956).
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Households express their preferences among these packages
through their decisions concerning where to live. Similarly, Ellick-
son argues, developers of residential associations compete with each
other, and potential residents shop around for the alternative that
best satisfies their preferences. "The Tiebout analysis," Ellickson
concludes, "suggests that this competition, and the related compe-
tition between cities and [residential] associations, tends to promote
an efficient distribution of community types." 11'
The prescriptive message that emerges from this analysis is that
the legal system should protect the integrity of residential associa-
tions. Courts should permit residential groups to adopt and enforce
internal rules that each group deems necessary for its own exist-
ence. Specifically, this means that courts usually should enforce
group restrictions on individual members' use and transfer of their
property interests in the affected development. So long as there is a
plausible instrumental connection between the restriction in ques-
tion and the existence of the residential group in its desired charac-
ter-that is, consistent with the values and objectives that it has
defined for itself-then courts should enforce the group rule. Most
importantly, the legal system should not demand compatibility be-
tween the internal rules of a residential group and external social or
political values, not held by the group in question.
Before shifting from the pluralist/public choice cluster of argu-
ments for group autonomy, we first need to note the fundamental
characteristic that they all share and that, in turn, distinguishes them
from communitarian arguments. Pluralist/public choice arguments
for group autonomy, in effect, extend the familiar liberal arguments
for individual autonomy to the group context. They simply substi-
tute groups for individuals. This basic identity between arguments
for individual and group autonomy in liberal theory flows directly
from the conception of groups that pluralist and public choice theo-
ries hold. As we saw earlier, those theories see all social groups as
simply the organizational form through which individuals express
and pursue their own self-interest." 12 On this view, groups are in-
herently corporativist. Piercing the veil, all that we find involved in
groups are preference-maximizing individuals.
The communitarian argument for group autonomy begins with
basically the same initial claim that pluralists and public-choice theo-
rists make, namely, that the flourishing of a rich variety of social
groups contributes to the social good. But communitarian thought
defines the good in fundamentally different terms than pluralist and
public-choice theories. Both the libertarian and social welfare
1 I Ellickson, Cities, supra note 16, at 1548.
112 See supra text accompanying notes 75-77.
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strands rely on subjective theories of the good. The social welfare
strand considers that the good consists solely in the satisfaction of
individual preferences, while the libertarian strand defines the good
in terms of preserving the free agency of individual actors. Instru-
mental welfare theories value group autonomy because the group
mode of social organization enables individuals to pursue and meet
their own personal desires. Non-instrumental libertarian arguments
endorse group autonomy as a by-product of their conception of the
good as consisting in uncoerced individual agency, rather than wel-
fare theory's preference-satisfaction. Although free agency and
preference-satisfaction are distinct from each other in important
ways, each theory defines the good within a subjective, individualist
framework.
Communitarians resist reducing the good to the satisfaction of
individual preferences or confining it to free agency (though they
are hardly indifferent to the problem of domination). The subjec-
tive conceptions of the good recognize collectivity to the extent that
individuals act within a social context. But the subjective, atomistic
understanding of collective action contradicts the ideal of commu-
nity. By focusing on the collective satisfaction of the desires of
members of society, welfare theory does admit the importance of
social interrelatedness. However, it confines intersubjectivity to the
level of instrumental collaboration.' 13 Communitarians insist that a
thicker conception of the good is possible without lapsing into
transcendentalism.
Roberto Unger's book Knowledge and Politics provides one such
conception which he calls the "actualization of human nature." 114
Unger emphasizes, however, that human nature, though immutable,
evolves in history as concrete persons confront concrete problems.
He argues that we should think of human nature, and, therefore, the
good, as having both universal and individual dimensions. The uni-
versal good is "the perfection of the species nature in which [each
person] participates by virtue of his sociability and of his abstract
selfhood." 115 The particular good is "the development of the
unique set of talents and capacities through which the species na-
ture of mankind takes a concrete form in him." 116
While other communitarians disagree with other aspects of Un-
ger's theory of the good, the common core of recent communitarian
work holds, as Unger does, that the self must be defined in relation
113 See P. WEIsS, supra note 98; Cornell, supra note 71, at 1097-98; Michael J. Sandel,
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, 12 POL. THEORY 81, 87 (1984).
114 R. UNGER, supra note 8, at 239.
115 Id.
116 Id
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to others and, further, that the good is the fulfillment of the self
achieved through life within a community. 117 This communitarian
conception of the good emphasizes the importance of the experi-
ence of participating as a member of a group (or groups) to individ-
ual identity and self-realization. Such an experience is,
communitarians argue, intrinsically good, rather than, as pluralist
and public choice theorists posit, valuable for its instrumental con-
tribution to fulfilling some individual desire. A recurrent and cru-
cial theme in communitarian thought is that community is valuable
just because it is the only context in which individuals can discover
and then fulfill their own identities.' 8 It is only through the experi-
ence of community that individuals can begin to resolve the prob-
lem of the self, that is, the task of fulfilling one's individuality while
expressing one's sociability.
The communitarian conceptions of the self and the good lay the
groundwork for related normative arguments for group autonomy
that differ significantly from the pluralist/public choice argument.
Communal groups embody "the shared spirit of the [members]
whose communal existence is an expression of who they really
are." 19 As Drucilla Cornell has articulated the point: "For the
state to refuse to protect the process of group self-definition is to
deny human beings one of their most fundamental modes of expres-
sion-the process of joining together in a group."' 120 Similarly,
non-radical communitarians like Paul Weiss and Michael Sandel' 2l
have emphasized the importance of allowing small-scale communi-
tarian groups-what Weiss somewhat misleadingly calls "limited
communes"' 22-to flourish as vehicles for self-expression in an in-
creasingly complex and depersonalized society.
Communitarians argue that for communities to flourish as
realms of empathy and concrete personality, society must be willing
to accede to them a substantial measure of immunity from external
control. Subjecting communities to collective control would quickly
transform them into just the mode of social organization to which
they are to be the alternative. Denying communities self-govern-
117 See M. SANDEL, supra note 8; see also C. TAYLOR, supra note 8; Cornell, supra note
71; Cornell, supra note 96, at 335.
118 Depending on what one means by "instrumental," communitarianism can be
considered an instrumental theory. It is instrumental in the sense that it understands
community as an enabling realm, that is, as a realm in which self-fulfillment is possible.
This conception is not reducible to the narrower sense of "instrumental," according to
which community is strictly a device that individuals use to achieve certain self-defined
ends.
119 Cornell, supra note 71, at 1101.
120 Id. at 1102.
121 See P. WEISS, supra note 98, at 5; M. SANDEL, supra note 8, at 17, 94-95.
122 P. WEIss, supra note 98, at 42-43, 51.
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ance would extend, not resolve, the problem of dominance. The
group would be subordinate to the will of the state as a second-
order form of domination. Because individuals would lose the op-
portunity to flourish in highly integrated networks of intersubjectiv-
ity, relegated to bureaucratic life as the only available mode of social
experience, the first-order form of domination would only become
more entrenched.
Yet, recognizing that there will be different visions of shared
goods which bind groups together, communitarians do concede an
important regulatory role to the state, namely that of preserving
communitarian pluralism. 123 The existence of each community re-
quires that no one community gain power to control other commu-
nities. Domination is as intolerable in the third-order form,
community-to-community, as it is in the other two forms. Only the
state, as a coordinator of relationships among communities, is in a
position to prevent the collapse of some communities to the will of
others. 124 The basic principle of communitarian autonomy grants
to the state regulatory powers that are consistent with the existence
of communal life.
At the same time, communitarians need to worry about the role
of the state in group life. State power to regulate group member-
ship or particular group practices constitutes a potential threat to
group existence. We should not try to define the appropriate limits
to state regulatory power over groups in the abstract. We can only
say in the abstract that while our society is basically committed to
the integrity of group life, that commitment has limits. How to de-
fine those limits is a very large question which I cannot adequately
address. 125
IV
RESIDENTIAL ASSOCIATIONS IN PUBLIC CHOICE/PLURALIST
THEORY
Before developing a communitarian theory that defines the lim-
123 See infra discussion in Part V; see also N. ROSENBLUM, supra note 71, at 125-51.
124 See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narra-
tive, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); R. UNGER, supra note 8, at 281-84.
125 See infra text accompanying notes 136-37. It is not hard to see that there are
appropriate limits to group existence if we imagine a group whose avowed purpose is,
for example, to kill Black people. Some groups simply should not exist. Beyond obvi-
ous examples like this one, it does not seem to me that there is any gain in the well-being
of our society if we protect groups whose explicit nomos is domination of others on the
basis of personal characteristics such as race, gender, or ethnic identity. I hasten to add
that while this criterion directly threatens groups like the Ku Klux Klan, I do not intend
that it jeopardize cultural or ethnic groups, such as, say, the Hibernian Society. Cf Mari
Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MicH. L. REv.
2320 (1989).
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its of group autonomy, we first need to see why public choice theory
and similar contractarian arguments for strong group autonomy are
inadequate. In this part I first criticize the contractarian foundation
on which many public choice theorists and several courts have at-
tempted to ground strong group autonomy. 126 I then argue that the
contractarian model is inadequate for analyzing residential associa-
tions because it fails to capture the complex social and psychological
experiences that these groups provide for their members. Finally, I
consider the instrumental argument that residential associations
ought to be immune from legal regulation because they constitute
pockets of civic participation and self-governance which com-
munitarians as well as public choice theorists ought to want to
protect.
A. Contractarian Arguments for Associational Autonomy
Proponents of strong autonomy for intentional groups com-
monly base their arguments for associational autonomy on the prin-
ciple of freedom of contract. Unsurprisingly, then, in debates over
judicial review of residential associations, opponents of the reasona-
bleness requirement have advanced familiar arguments for non-in-
terference with voluntary transactions. They argue that because
residential associations are created by private agreements, courts
should enforce internal group rules, subject only to minimal review
to assure that the rules were consensually created.127 They have re-
lied on either (sometimes both) of two related but distinct notions-
individual autonomy and social welfare. The deficiences in these ar-
guments are well known. Nevertheless, it seems necessary to repeat
them here because opponents of legal regulation in residential as-
sociations develop individual autonomy and social welfare theories
as though these notions were entirely unproblematic. We need to
remind ourselves that individual autonomy and social welfare are
not simply problematic, but are altogether inadequate grounds for
immunizing residential associations from collective disruption.
The individual autonomy argument for securing strong auton-
omy for contractual groups begins with the proposition that concep-
126 See, e.g., Gregory v. City of San Juan Capistrano, 142 Cal. App. 3d 72, 90, 191
Cal. Rptr. 47, 59 (1983) (affirming condominium rule giving right of first refusal to resi-
dential association on the ground that the residents voluntarily granted the right to the
association), overruled on other grounds, Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 664, 693 P.2d
261, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1984); Breene v. Plaza Tower Ass'n, 310 N.W.2d 730, 734
(N.D. 1981) (amendment procedure in condominium declaration construed as a con-
tractual waiver of statutory rights); Ellickson, Cities, supra note 16, at 1527, 1527 n.31
(describing the proposed model as "contractarian"); Reichman, Residential Governments,
supra note 22, at 275-79 (developing consent model); see also Richard A. Epstein, Notice
and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353 (1982).
127 See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
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tions of the good are mere preferences and, as such, are strictly
subjective. The state should be neutral with respect to differing
conceptions of the good. Recognizing and protecting individual au-
tonomy means that people ought to be free to pursue their own life
plans. Individuals who wish to participate in intentional group life
should be free to do so. Neutrality and liberty, moreover, mean that
the state must remain neutral with respect to groups, through which
individuals pursue different shared life plans. Intentional groups
should have the power to enforce, free from legal interference, obli-
gations created by the internal rules to which their members have
assented. Legal review of these internal group rules is justified only
to the extent of assuring that the consent was genuine. Any legal
involvement beyond this inquiry, including substantive judicial re-
view, constitutes a form of collective coercion and deviates from the
proper commitment to neutrality.
The collective welfare variation of this argument posits that
since individuals know best what is in their self-interest, we maxi-
mize aggregate social welfare by effectuating private preferences,
particularly as people reveal their preferences through consensual
transactions. With respect to contractual groups, contractarians fre-
quently argue that social welfare increases as individuals collaborate
in groups, and that for voluntary groups to thrive, they must be per-
mitted to practice self-governance. Social welfare advocates for
group autonomy attach particular importance to membership rules,
believing that groups cannot survive, let alone thrive, unless they
control their own membership. Group existence entails group self-
governance, at least as to those rules that are necessary to maintain
internal compatibility among all members of the groups.128
Neither individual autonomy nor social welfare, however, pro-
vide adequate grounds for immunizing associational rules from
legal review. Critics of both strands of contractarian theory have
offered a variety of objections, but I want to stress two basic points
emerging from these critiques. First, the conception of the self that
is embedded in both versions of contractarianism is so thin that it it
scarcely resembles our experienced reality. Second, even taken on
its own terms, the contractarian argument is self-defeating. Both of
these points critique contractarian arguments internally, that is, tak-
ing these arguments on their own terms. I leave the counter-vision
of the self and social relationships that is the foundation of commu-
nitarian thought to Part V.
At the core of both individual autonomy and social welfare ar-
128 See, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 202
(1937) ("[T]he group as a corporate body [should] be given power to coerce under the
sanction of law dissentient members of the group.").
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guments for associational immunity is a conception of the self as
autonomous, unitary, and integrated. Both arguments assume that
individuals are by nature atomistic. This means that they form their
preferences internally, not socially. It means further that the self-
knowledge that is the basis for their preferences is, at least theoreti-
cally, complete, since self-knowledge is acquired internally. They
further assume that this self-knowledge is consistent and definite.
Since contractarians believe that people know themselves apart
from their relationships with others, contractarians assume that peo-
ple know what they want and act accordingly. In other words, peo-
ple have complete, self-contained, and consistent life plans, and
they form these life plans atomistically.
To describe this picture of the self is to reveal its inadequacy.
To begin, the familiar problems of incomplete information, behav-
ioral adaptation to what is available, weakness of will, and other
forms of cognitive distortion bedevil the easy claims about autono-
mous preference-formation.1 29 More fundamentally, even if we ig-
nore problems posed by distorting influences, it is not at all clear
what respect for personal autonomy requires. The very notion of
the autonomous self is highly problematic. Several writers recently
have argued that, in a meaningful and important sense, the self is
not constant or fixed over time.' 30 A person possesses different
identities at different times; our later selves are not identical to our
former selves. Our psychological connection with our past selves
sometimes becomes so attenuated that we say, "I am not the same
person that I was then." Moreover, we possess different, sometimes
conflicting, identities at the same time. These conflicting and simul-
taneous personalities are manifested, for example, in the instances
of stultifying ambivalence that each of us experiences at various
times. These are not matters of weakness of will. Being weak-willed
presupposes that a person has settled preferences, enabled by com-
plete self-knowledge, but is unable to act upon those preferences for
some reason. The phenomenon of the multiple self suggests that
this picture of settled preferences and complete self-knowledge is
chimerical; it just isn't us. People regularly experience ambivalence
and regret,' 3 ' not because their preferences conflict, but because
129 SeeJoN ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES (1983); Cass R. Sunstein, Disrupting Voluntary Trans-
actions, in NoMos XXXI: MARKETS AND JUSTICE 279 (John W. Chapman &J. Roland Pen-
nock eds. 1989).
130 See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984); THE MULTIPLE SELF (Jon Elster
ed. 1986); Donald H. Regan, Justifications for Paternalism, in NoMos XV: THE LIMITS OF
LAW 189 (J. Roland Pennock &John W. Chapman eds. 1974). This conception rejects
Kant's conception of the self as "fixed and abiding." IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE
REASON 136 (Norman Kemp Smith trans. 1965).
131 See Mark Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 769.
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their preferences are often incomplete, inconsistent, and externally
generated. The contractarian argument, then, is premised on a pic-
ture of human personality that grossly distorts our experienced
reality.
The second internal critique focuses on the self-defeating char-
acter of the contractarian approach to neutrality. Neutrality in its
fullest sense represents a commitment to non-coercion-in all social
spheres-and to mutual empowerment. It is not a synonym for
legal deference. Contractarian writers themselves have tacitly ad-
mitted that neutrality, at least at times, requires legal intervention.
They concede that the polity must impose some limitations on free-
dom to contract to prevent autonomy from destroying itself.132 So,
to take a particularly obvious example, freedom of contract by itself
implies that individual owners could (and we know that some resi-
dential development dwellers in the past have done so) create a rule
barring each of them from selling their property interests to anyone
who is not white. Most contractarians,133 however, expressly ac-
knowledge the legitimacy of legal intervention to strike down such
rules, even though those rules were consensually created.1 34 The
principle that contracting parties cannot be permitted to harm third
persons requires collective prohibition of racially discriminatory
restrictions.1 3 5
The harm principle acknowledges that legal non-interference,
premised on the principle of contractual freedom, undermines con-
tractarianism's very commitment to neutrality. Failure of the polity
to regulate groups privileges one group's vision of the good over
132 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN 112-21 (1985). More recently, Professor Epstein has justified this excep-
tion exclusively in terms of the cost-oriented instrumental reasoning that is
characteristic of pluralist and public choice writers. The problem of externalities-
harms to third persons-requires that the legal system impose restrictions on freedom
of contract and freedom of disposition whenever the original owner fails to internalize
all of the possible third-person harms, despite her incentives to do so. See Epstein, Cove-
nants, supra note 63. While the shift to economic reasoning avoids conceptualism's de-
fects, it creates new dilemmas for contractarianism as a basis of grounding strong group
autonomy. By explicitly socializing the basis for enforcement or non-enforcement of
individual restrictions, it opens every group restriction to challenge as an "externality,"
a harm to third persons. In other words, there is no categorical basis for rejecting any
given challenge. For a similar critique of Epstein's concession, see Thomas C. Grey, The
Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21 (1986).
133 For an indication of how contractarian premises can be extended beyond limits
that even most contractarians regard as acceptable while remaining entirely consistent
with those premises, see JAN NARVESON, THE LIBERTARIAN IDEA (1988).
134 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
135 Epstein, Covenants, supra note 63, at 917-19; see also Ellickson, Cities, supra note 16,
at 1528 ("External legal norms... in some instances should lead to the judicial invalida-
tion of offensive [private] 'constitutional' provisions, such as those that would regulate
the racial characteristics of association members.").
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equally valid competing visions. Stated more directly, strong group
autonomy empowers discrete groups to dominate others. There is
no state neutrality when, in the name of freedom of contract, the
legal system confers upon groups the power to coerce those who do
not conform to their private preferences.S 6 Neutrality exists only
when the state has acted to assure that all groups and all individuals
are mutually empowered, not merely formally, but in fact.' 37
Racially discriminatory group restrictions are not an exception.
Precisely because there are competing visions, effectuating one
group's preferences always means sacrificing someone else's. The
problem of "private" coercion is ubiquitous, not localized. We
know perfectly well that maintaining internal group compatibility-
which is just another way of saying that difference is an acceptable
ground for exclusion-comes at someone's expense. The nearly
unanimous agreement in our society about the legitimacy of legal
prohibitions against racially discriminatory group rules is a powerful
indicator that we share the intuition that social well-being is often
undermined, not advanced, by effectuating consensual agreements.
Legal interference with some group rules, particularly those
controlling membership, undoubtedly does threaten the existence
of the affected groups. But group existence is not an unqualified
good. Two major questions, which I cannot address here, but which
very much need full discussion, are whether our society should re-
fuse its protection to certain groups, and if so, which groups, and by
what criteria. Our commitment to group life should not prevent us
from discussing whether groups whose ideologies legitimate exclu-
sion and domination based on racial, gender, or ethnic differences
should themselves be excluded. There simply are limits to our com-
mitment to group life and to the contractual freedom to create
groups, however difficult it may be to define those limits.
Nonetheless, we remain basically committed to group life, and
this creates a dilemma. Somehow we must reconcile group life-our
commitment to human thriving through group experiences-with
our shared commitment not merely to neutrality but, stated more
robustly, to difference as a basis for social connectedness rather
than exclusion. That commitment is reflected, among other ways, in
the meaning that we have created for the constitutional obligation
to provide equal protection of law to all citizens. The meaning that
136 Cf David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUM. L.
REV. 727, 731 (1942):
[T]he very importance of groups in the democratic process means, if
stratification is to be avoided and a dynamic social life retained, that each
group must be subject to the scrutiny and criticism of opposing groups-
and of its own membership.
137 See supra text accompanying note 124.
[Vol. 75:1
GROUP AUTONOMY
we attach to the constitutional requirement of equal protection re-
flects, in part, the balance that we have struck. Fully addressing that
dilemma, however, requires that we, collectively and deliberately,
determine which group practices are compatible with our commit-
ment to creating an inclusionary society and which undermine it.
Strong group autonomy does not respond to that dilemma; it as-
sumes it away. It denies those who are outside the group but who
are connected with the group by virtue of our common humanity
and our common participation in society-the opportunity to make
collective judgments about group practices. The vision of strong
group autonomy, empowering discrete contractual groups to prac-
tice self-governance on terms that they and they alone establish,
represents an incomplete realization of our social commitment-the
flourishing of group life at the expense of inclusion. That vision
certainly does not promote our collective welfare; it directly threat-
ens it.
B. Modelling Residential Associations
The norm by which proposals of group autonomy seek to pro-
vide immunity for residential groups from legal interference de-
pends on whether the specific conception of groups they apply is
contractarian or communitarian. Therefore, we must determine
whether residential groups are exclusively contractarian groups or
whether, beneath their contractual veneer, they exhibit characteris-
tics of communities as well as contractual aspects. Of course, plural-
ist/public choice theorists do not address this question because they
do not recognize the distinction between contractarian and commu-
nitarian intentional groups. But communitarian theory does put the
question before us. What is at stake in this section is public choice
theory's view that all intentional social groups are appropriately
modelled strictly within a contractarian framework. It is important
to emphasize that for purposes of evaluating the public choice the-
ory of groups it is only necessary to determine whether, as that the-
ory claims, all residential groups, indeed all intentional social
groups, are exclusively contractarian. For if we conclude that the
categories of contractarian and communitarian groups are only ideal
types and that groups in reality are best understood as mixtures of
the two, then, because of its imperialist claim, the public choice the-
ory fails. Public choice theory might still be useful even if groups
turned out to be mixtures of the two types, but then its role would
be reduced to that of a heuristic model rather than a description of
concrete groups. Treating its theory of groups as a model would
significantly change the character of both its descriptive claims, for
models, as reductions of social reality, inevitably distort that reality
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and its normative claims. A political theory for group autonomy
would then have to take account of the non-contractual aspects of
groups. Public choice theory does not do so.
On the surface, residential associations appear to be straight-
forward examples of voluntary associations rather than communi-
ties. Residential associations are created explicitly by contract.
Membership is overtly based on consent, which members express by
purchasing their property interest in the development. In this con-
text, the social contract is not a metaphor; the legal documents,
which typically include a declaration of covenants, articles of incor-
poration, and by-laws, all evidence agreement to the rules of the
group.
At the same time, however, the contractarian model of residen-
tial associations is incomplete. Its focus on the formal mode of crea-
tion leads it to ignore the character of social relations within
residential groups. As a result, it fails to distinguish between resi-
dential groups that are held together only by mutual collaboration
and convenience, 138 and those in which individuals choose to five
together because of more deeply shared values. That is, it ignores
the distinction between gemeinschaft and gesellschaft. More specifi-
cally, its contractarian analysis overlooks the combination of these as-
pects, in the creation of a residential group. Some empirical work
done on the character of social relations within residential associa-
tions suggests that this combination exists in modem American resi-
dential groups. 39
Frances Fitzgerald's recent account of Sun City Center details
the social experience of members of one residential association, an
age-segregated retirement development in Florida. 40 Her study
reveals that although some social differentiation does exist in within
the group, the population of Sun City Center is strikingly homoge-
neous in virtually all respects. "They came to Sun City," Fitzgerald
observes, "for all of the amenities spelled out in the advertising
brochures and for a homogeneity that had little to do with age. In a
country where class is rarely discussed, they had found their own
niche like homing pigeons."' 14 Because of that homogeneity, rela-
tionships form easily in Sun City, and the inhabitants feel quite com-
fortable with each other. They regularly socialize with each other,
138 See Sandel, supra note 113, at 87.
139 Findings that within at least some residential associations social relationships are
affective and mutual does not imply the civic, or governmental, character of those as-
sociations is. The next section expresses skepticism about the prevalence of resident
participation in governing residential associations, even in developments where social
relationships are communal.
140 FRANCES FITzGERALD, CrnEs ON A HILL (1986).
141 Id. at 220.
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making isolation from other residents virtually non-existent. They
are attracted to each other by their shared values and preferences,
and they have created a mode of existence consciously based on that
sharing of values and preferences. The effect is that residents of
Sun City exhibit a deep sense of belonging ther-e and belonging with
each other.
Residential groups like Sun City Center are best understood as
a type of constitutive group, that is, a community. The concept of a
constitutive group implies an element of involuntariness. 142 What
binds the group together is a shared characteristic that is unchosen,
or chosen only in a weak sense, such as cultural identity. But it is
erroneous to suppose that community contradicts voluntariness.
Two crucial insights lay behind the notion of constitutive groups.
First, individuals define themselves according to some shared good;
second, that good gives to each member of the group a sense of
belonging. The experience of belonging can be based on a shared
good that individuals have chosen. Consider, again, my earlier ex-
ample of a monastery. 143 Monasteries are residential communities
based on shared characteristics that some people suppose individu-
als have the power to choose, i.e., religious commitment. 44 Mem-
bers of the monastery interpret their personal identities on the basis
of that characteristic, which each defines as a good. The self-iden-
tity created by that interpretation virtually impels monks to live in
close proximity with each other. In a similar, albeit, weaker, sense,
Fitzgerald's account suggests the possibility that the residents of
Sun City Center experience the need to live together with other
older adults who have made the same life-style choices. Voluntari-
ness and involuntariness are combined in the constitution of such
groups.
To be sure, residential associations vary widely in the mixture
of communal and contractarian ties that they exhibit. On the sur-
face, many appear to be predominately contractarian aggregations
of individuals who exhibit few affective ties with each other. One
may react skeptically toward the typical promotional literature that
advertises residential associations as "communities" on the basis of
shared swimming pools and security patrols. Reliance on these fac-
tors alone as evidence of community is, as Thomas Bender states, a
''cynical manipulation of symbols of community" that trivializes the
very ideal of community. 145 But shared resources, like swimming
142 See supra text accompanying notes 84-86; see also Garet, supra note 65, at 1045.
143 See supra text accompanying note 102.
144 I am profoundly skeptical that one can meaningfully talk about choosing religious
commitment, but I recognize that others think that choice applies here as in other
matters.
145 T. BENDER, supra note 89, at 144.
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pools, do affect the social relationships among users, shaping the
character of those relationships into one that can be called commu-
nitarian. Residents of common unit developments have commented
that their arrangements are "more friendly than in a single family
home development.., because we see each other more often at the
pool, and we see each other a lot at board meetings, and we've had
some problems that we've all had to work out together. I think
there's a feeling of togetherness."1 46 At the same time, as Con-
stance Perin remarks in her study of the culture of condominium
ownership, "Feelings of goodwill notwithstanding, condo owners
act on the market-driven reciprocity expressly built into their rela-
tionship from the start."' 47
Perhaps more than in any other group in modem American so-
ciety, residential associations overtly blend contractarian and com-
munitarian dimensions of group relationships. Common ownership
requires that residents sacrifice individual autonomy for sharing.
They choose to be tied together, and, although that choice may ini-
tially have been motivated by instrumental reasons, the experience
of being tied together creates new, qualitatively different layers in
their personal relationships. While at one level sharing in common
unit developments is explicitly collaborative, required by the resi-
dents' contracts, it generates other levels of sharing that transcend
mere collaboration. Describing life within residential associations
requires that we identify the multiple layers of the residents' rela-
tionships and understand how they can affect each other.
What studies like Fitzgerald's and Perin's reveal, then, is the
inadequacy of the public-choice description of groups, both as ap-
plied to residential associations and generally. Its central weakness
is its exclusive focus on the formal basis of group constitution. As a
result, it fails to draw any distinctions among intentional groups on
the basis of the character of social relations within them. A thicker
account of social groups is needed to capture the distinction be-
tween sharing and collaboration and the different mixtures of those
factors within various intentional groups. 148 By looking beyond the
formal mode of creation to the character of relationships, communi-
tarian theory is able to recognize both how intentional groups differ
from one another in their mixtures of contractarian and communi-
146 Steven Jay Tulin, Residents' Use of Common Areas in Condominium Develop-
ments 192 (Jan. 1978) (M.S. thesis, Cornell University).
147 CONSTANCE PERIN, BELONGING IN AMERICA 76 (1988).
148 The clearest example of a residential group that evades description in con-
tractarian terms-that is, one that is strongly characterized by gemeinschaft-is the resi-
dential commune. An excellent study of residential communes, giving close attention to
the character of social relations, is L. VEYSEY, supra note 94.
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tarian, and how they are alike in combining multiple levels of
experience.
C. Associational Autonomy and Civic Participation
Since de Tocqueville, it has been common to praise voluntary
associations for the "public values of the private association."1 49
The claim is that voluntary associations represent pockets of partici-
pation and self-governance in a society otherwise characterized by
powerlessness and indifference. This argument for ceding strong
autonomy to voluntary associations deserves serious attention, espe-
cially in the context of residential associations. If there are good
reasons to believe that residential associations represent laborato-
ries of undominated participation and self-governance, then we
ought to be very reluctant to interfere with them, not in the interest
of freedom of contract, but out of a commitment to communitarian
values. The crucial question is whether residential associations on
the whole provide appropriate conditions for nurturing par-
ticipatory governance.
Recent empirical studies on residential associations suggest
that the vision of self-governance and participatory democracy
within these groups often is illusory.' 50 It indicates that in some
common unit developments residents are at best uninvolved in their
homeowners association, and at worst frustrated and disillusioned
with their private governance structures. Apparently, association
boards often make little effort to involve residents, in part because
they want to avoid the increased likelihood of disagreement, but
more fundamentally because board members do not view them-
selves as occupying authoritative roles. Rather, they perceive their
function as a combination of property managers and neighbors.
Neither the citizens nor the managers of these "private residential
governments" display an awareness of their experience in overtly
political terms. 15 1
149 See Grant McConnell, The Public Values of the Private Association, in NoMos XI: VOL-
UNTARY AsSOCIATioNS 147 (J. Pennock &J. Chapman eds. 1969).
150 See Stephen E. Barton & Carol S. Silverman, Common Interest Homeowners'
Associations (August 1989) (forthcoming in PUB. AFF. REP.) [hereinafter Common Inter-
est]; Public Life, supra note 20, at 14; Robert R. Werkele, Robert Dragicevie, Richard
Jordan, Irene Kszyk Rszyk & Margaret Sorenson, Contradictions in Ownership, Participation,
and Control, in THE CONSUMER EXPERIENCE OF HOUSING 170 (Clare Ungerson & Valerie
Karn eds. 1980); James J. Scavo, Dispute Resolution in a Community Association, 17 URB. L.
ANN. 295 (1979); Scott, The Homes Association: Will 'Private Government' Serve the Public
Interest?, 8 PUB. AFF. REP. 1 (1967).
151 The prevalence of this experience is unclear and probably unknowable. The
likely reality is that the level of participation, both among and within residential associa-
tions, is very uneven. No doubt, in some developments genuine opportunities exist for
self-governance and civic participation. Even if we assumed, however, that widespread
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The failure of residential associations to realize the image of
participatory democracy is not due simply to a rational choice by
owners to forego opportunities to participate in the association's
civic affairs. The gap that exists between the Panglossian image of
many residential associations and reality stems, at least in part, from
the unequal allocation of power within these developments. Private
residential governments too often represent a dominated mode of
residential life in modern America.
Several factors undermine the participatory and self-governing
character of some residential associations. One obvious source of
domination is developer control. 152 Association by-laws enable de-
velopers to control crucial aspects of governance, not only at the
inception of the project, but also after most of the units in the devel-
opment have been sold.'53 A development's "constitution," ini-
tially provided by the developer, typically may be amended only
with the concurrence of both mortgage lenders and owners or by
super-majorities (i.e., 75%) of owners. Developers also frequently
remain on the association board for many years after it formally has
passed to the control of homeowners. Their longevity gives them
substantial clout within the nominally independent board. 154
I do not suggest that all, or perhaps even most, residential as-
sociations are tainted by fraud or other distorting influences. The
caricature of developers as villains dressed in black and twirling
their mustaches while purchasers sign residential association agree-
ments is, of course, only that-a caricature. But just as we ought to
resist depicting common-unit developments as thoroughly tainted
by duress or ill-considered choices, so we must reject portraits of
residential associations as unqualified realms of enlightened individ-
ual preference-maximizing behavior. People buying into common-
unit developments not infrequently have stated that they exper-
participation is the dominant experience, it would still be implausible to attribute the
rise in popularity of common unit developments solely to purchaser's perceptions that
this mode of housing offers a unique opportunity to practice self-governance. Common
unit developments typically are marketed as "carefree living," not as self-governing resi-
dential enterprises. They also are marketed as "communities," and, as I have already
indicated, some residents appear to be attracted by the group character in common unit
developments. But the desire to live in close proximity with others and to establish
some degree of affective bonds with one's neighbors does not translate into active self-
governance. Individuals can experience social attachment with their neighbors and still
remain unengaged in the civic life of the residential group.
152 I wish to emphasize again that while some common unit developments seem to
be non-participatory and non-communitarian, this is not universally the case. Some do
exhibit participatory and communitarian characteristics. The general point is that com-
mon unit developments are best understood as mixtures of contractarian and communi-
tarian experience. See supra note 10 and text accompanying notes 158-67.
153 See Common Interest, supra note 150, at 9-11.
154 See id. at 10-11.
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ienced coercion in agreeing to association rules and in joining the
association itself.1 55 A finding of no legal coercion cannot eliminate
this experienced reality. That these individuals experienced coer-
cion is itself a truth. We will move much closer to a full understand-
ing of social experiences within common-unit developments if we
say, at the risk of stating the obvious, that people's experiences in
this context are extremely complex. The desire for communal ties
accompanies financial motives; regret, ambivalence, and misunder-
standing accompany rational choice; domination accompanies
autonomy.
A second factor belying the participatory character of residen-
tial associations is the virtually standard restriction of voting rights
to owners 156 -a practice that simultaneously disenfranchises renting
residents and enhances the power of non-resident owners who own
more than one unit in the development. 157 Theories of par-
ticipatory democracy stress the importance of widely-held voting
rights, not because of the economic value that individuals attach to
that right, but to enable individuals to gain control over their lives
by "distributing 'voice' through which individuals may have their say
in the social determinations of the structure of coercion and re-
straint."158 On this view, it is quite beside the point that renters do
not value the franchise as much as owners, assuming for the mo-
ment that this assertion is justified. The rules of a residential associ-
ation, a "structure of coercion and restraint,"' 59 dearly affect
renters, and the participatory objective of avoiding conditions of
personal domination apply to these persons as fully as they do to
owners.
One might attempt to use republican political theory to defend
rules conditioning the franchise on ownership. The rule limiting
voting rights in residential association to owners resembles early
American state provisions restricting the franchise by various prop-
erty qualifications-restrictions that grew out of one branch of re-
publican political thought. 160  The republican rationale for
155 See id. at 12.
156 State statutes regulating condominiums generally direct that voting rights in resi-
dential associations be allocated on some ownership basis. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-8-7
(6)-(7) (1977); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 11-101(h), 11-107 (1981). See Ellickson,
Cities, supra note 16, at 1543-45; Note, Democracy in the New Towns: The Limits of Private
Government, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 379 (1969) (authored by Albert A. Foer).
157 One study estimates that renters occupy a median of twenty percent of all com-
mon interest development units in California. Common Interest, supra note 20, at 8.
158 Frank I. Michelman, Universal Resident Suffrage, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1581, 1587
(1982).
159 Id.
160 See FORREST McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS
OF THE CONSTITUTION 153 (1985).
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qualifying the franchise on property ownership, however, was not,
as it is for public choice theorists, protecting property rights as a
means to maximizing aggregate wealth. Rather, the republican the-
ory was that the polity had to condition the franchise on ownership
of land, more particularly, fee-simple ownership, to create a secure
foundation for citizenship. Ownership assured that citizens were
immune from corruption and freed them to pursue civic virtue. For
a republican like James Harrington, the way to mediate security of
property with widespread civic participation was to redistribute
property (especially non-feudal, "allodial" interests in land) broadly
within society so that citizenship-and the opportunity to partici-
pate-would be widely available. That is, Harrington's commitment
to participation fueled, rather than blocked, an egalitarian position
on property distribution.' 6 1
The public choice scheme of government-and the scheme
presently reflected in residential associations with their property-
based franchise-in fact more nearly resembles what Joyce Appleby
and other historians have labelled as the elitist version of republican
political theory, or what Frank Michelman calls the "exclusionary
strategy" of republicanism,162 than they do participatory democ-
racy. Classical republicans recoiled at the thought of widespread
citizenship. Ordinary people, these republicans thought, lacked the
basic intellectual capacity and judgment for virtuous self-rule, and
no amount of property could remedy such deficiencies. Far from
identifying republican governance with participatory democracy,
this strand of republican theory is its antithesis. 16 3
The vision of common-unit developments as laboratories of
small-scale democracy and civic participation, then, distorts social
reality. The American romance with voluntary associations that
originated in de Tocqueville's discussion of voluntary groups dies
hard.' 64 There may well be voluntary groups within modern Ameri-
can society that still fit de Tocqueville's model-pockets of life
161 See James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana, in THE POLITICAL WORKS OF
JAMES HARRINGTON 170 (J. Pocock ed. 1977). This is not to say that all republicans held
egalitarian notions of property distribution. On elitist aspects of republicanism, see, e.g.,
Hendrik Hartog, Imposing Constitutional Traditions, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75 (1987);
Frank I. Michelman, Possession v. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 IOWA L.
REV. 1319 (1987).
162 See Michelman, supra note 161, at 1330.
163 For discussions of the elitist strand of republicanism, see JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPI-
TALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN VISION OF THE 1790s 8-19 (1984);
Joyce Appleby, What Is Still American in the Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson, 39 WM. &
MARY Q. 287, 297-301 (1982); Hutson, Country, Court and Constitution: Antifederalism and
the Historians, 38 WM & MARY Q. 337, 356-68 (1981).
164 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 222-26 (importance of "political" associa-
tions in America); 2 id. at 128-33, 138-44 (on "civil" associations). On the continuing
strength of, but theoretical discontinuities within, the Tocquevillean celebration of vol-
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within which one can experience in a full and meaningful way par-
ticipatory self-governance undistorted by external forces. But I am
profoundly skeptical that common unit developments represent a
strong example of such places where the vita activa is actually
experienced.
V
RESIDENTIAL AsSOCIATIONS AND THE LIMITS OF
COMMUNAL AUTONOMY
In a very real sense, normative communitarian theories share
with normative individualist theories a common animating vision,
namely, allowing people "to live.., as deeply satisfying a life as any
of which [they are] capable."' 65 The difference between the concep-
tions of the self that the communitarian and individualist traditions
hold, however, lead them to define the conditions under which peo-
ple live fulfilling lives in opposing ways. For individualists, either as
a matter of human nature or as a matter of contingent cultural con-
ditions, humans have most fulfilling lives under conditions of indi-
vidual autonomy, that is, conditions in which individuals are free to
pursue their own conceptions of the good without collective inhibi-
tions (save those required to preserve individual autonomy for
others). For communitarians, on the other hand, individuals must
live in conditions in which their sociability is fully recognized and
encouraged in order to develop their concrete personalities.
Modern communitarian theory aims at developing an alterna-
tive to both atomistic individualism and classical communitarianism.
Both of these political traditions respond to the tension between self
and others by choosing between the self and the other rather than
fusing them. Atomistic individualism reduces the self-other rela-
tionship to a condition of instrumental servitude in which the role of
the other is subordinated to individual desires. That conception of
untary associations, see FRANKLIN GAMWELL, BEYOND PREFERENCE: LIBERAL THEORIES OF
INDEPENDENT ASSOCIATIONS (1984).
165 MICHAELJ. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAw 19 (1988). Professor Perry la-
bels this vision "human flourishing." I am not entirely comfortable with the notion of
human flourishing. One problem is that it risks association with an individualist outlook
based on the familiar self-interest conception of rationality, according to which individu-
als should aim at "the outcomes that would be best for [each person], and that would
make his life go, for him, as well as possible." D. PARFIT, supra note 129, at 3. But this
interpretation does not capture the political vision that underlies its use in communitar-
ian discourse. The meaning that communitarians attach to it rejects the view that people
by nature are, or ought to be, committed to only their own well-being. Another problem
is that, unless it is used in so broad a sense as to lack any meaning, human fluorishing
tends to slide into foundationalism, with the metaphysical view that there is some irre-
ducible core to human nature and that there is an objective standard of right and wrong.
For a discussion of some of the problems with Perry's project, see Joan C. Williams,
Abortion, Incommensurability, and Jurisprudence, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1651 (1989).
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the relationship assumes the ontological autonomy (i.e., non-social-
ity) of the self. Hence, it begs the central question which is how the
self and the other can be defined without giving priority to, or
privileging, either. Classical communitarianism similarly defines
away the problem by positing a unity (as distinguished from a fu-
sion) of the self and the other, at the expense of individual auton-
omy. 16 6 Classical communitarianism attributes to groups all of the
attributes of the self. 167 Its central error is to suppose that connect-
ing self with other in a non-instrumental, non-atomistic way re-
quired collapsing the self into the other. Atomism and classical
communitarianism share, then, the mistaken assumption that there
is no way to avoid attaching ontological priority to either the self or
the other. What is needed is a conception of the relationship in
which the self is understood as socially constituted such that the self
can never be defined independently of the other, but at the same
time is understood as a free agent. As Nancy Rosenbaum has ex-
pressed the point, "The challenge of repairing the communitarian
failings of liberal thought is somehow to conceive of community
without appealing to examples of all-consuming public spirit such as
ancient Greek citizenship or revolutionary republicanism with its
Jacobin fervor, without idealizing primitive communities, and with-
out resorting to organicism."' 68
It is just this conception that underlies the communitarian ideal
of universal community. That ideal expresses the imaginative vision
of a social order whose foundation replaces consensus with empa-
thy. In its ethical aspect, universal community connects the self with
the other through relationships of reciprocity. In its political aspect,
universal community is an arrangement in which individuals equally
and fully participate in the striving for shared values. Universal
community is a regulative ideal only, but social practices may pro-
gress toward that ideal through processes and institutions that in-
creasingly equalize individual participation in the public formulation
of common values.
In elaborating the implications of this communitarian ideal,
communitarians have been sensitive to the problem of scale. 169
166 See B. BARBER, supra note 8, at 148-50, 230-32.
167 See G. HEGEL, supra note 73, at 37-40. Drucilla Cornell attributes Hegel's failure
adequately to recognize the individual to his notion of Geist. See Cornell, supra note 71,
at 1092 n.16.
168 N. ROSENBAUM, supra note 71, at 153.
169 See, e.g., Frug, supra note 8. Modern communitarians, particularly those who em-
phasize participatory democracy, are well-aware of the significance of the problem of
scale in classical republican theory and its successors. Eighteenth-century American
republicans, for example, worried that western expansion would destroy the social con-
ditions for civic participation. See R. WIEBE, supra note 3, at 27-46.
Sensitivity to the problem of scale for democratic government is not, of course,
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Continuing a tradition that includes, among others, Rousseau, Mon-
tesquieu, and Aristotle, they have argued that the communitarian
project of self-realization through participatory governance requires
preservation of what Jiirgen Habermas calls the "lifeworld"-a
realm of social activity in which individuals interact with each other
as concrete, not abstract, personalities, and in which they imagine
each other with reciprocal empathy, 170 rather than with detached in-
strumental calculation. Many communitarians see localism as the
path to maintaining (or, in a bureaucratic society, recreating) such
spheres of activity. During the 1960s, Saul Alinsky,17 ' Paul Good-
man,' 72 Tom Hayden,' 73 and others174 attempted to articulate "a
theory of local sovereignty."' 75 Twenty years later, the same vision
underlies Roberto Unger's theory of "organic groups,"' 76 Benja-
min Barber's "strong democracy,"1 77 and Gerald Frug's empowered
city. 178 All reflect a normative commitment to self-governance by
groups as the basic form of communitarian praxis.
The scheme of small-scale communitarian governance suggests
yet another argument for autonomous residential associations, Un-
like the argument from individual autonomy, this argument from
the norm of communal autonomy explicitly acknowledges the group
character of residential associations. It also avoids the central weak-
ness of the argument from associational autonomy by acknowledg-
ing the plurality of group types, specifically the non-contractarian,
constitutive group. The question remains, then, whether strong
deference to residential association rules is justified by the norm of
communal autonomy. That question ushers in the more basic ques-
tion of the appropriate limits of communitarian self-governance.
Initially, we need to recall that the appropriateness of charac-
terizing residential associations, individually or generally, is inher-
limited to communitarians, including both the left and Burkean strands. Some pluralists
as well as communitarians have paid close attention to scale. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL,
DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY VERSUS CONTROL 12-16, 140-146
(1982); ROBERT A. DAHL & EDWARD TUFTE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY passim (1973).
170 See JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, VOL. 2:
LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON (T. McCarthy trans.
1987).
171 See SAUL ALINSKY, REVEILLE FOR RADICALS (1969).
172 See PERCIVAL GOODMAN & PAUL GOODMAN, COMMUNITAS (1960).
173 See JAMES E. MILLER, DEMOCRACY IS IN THE STREETS 93-98, 142-54 (1987).
174 See, e.g., DAVID MORRIS & KARL HESS, NEIGHBORHOOD POWER: THE NEW LOCAL-
ISM (1975); MILTON KOTLER, NEIGHBORHOOD GOVERNMENT: THE LOCAL FOUNDATIONS OF
POLITICAL LIFE (1969).
175 M. KOTLER, supra note 174, at 100.
176 R. UNGER, supra note 8, at 259-90.
177 B. BARBER, supra note 8, at 261-311.
178 See Frug, supra note 8.
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ently an open question. As I indicated earlier,1 79 contractarian and
communitarian groups are only ideal types. Particular groups in-
clude both dimensions in different mixtures. Applying the label
"community" is itself a political statement, originating in a particu-
lar political conception of community and constantly open to chal-
lenge from a different political conception. Nevertheless, for
purposes of getting to the basic normative question, we will provi-
sionally assume that it is not fanciful to regard at least some residen-
tial associations as communitarian groups.
The aspect of many residential associations that makes the com-
munitarian characterization plausible is the very aspect that sows the
seeds of deep ambivalence about communitarian self-governance.
What connects the residents of many common-unit developments
together is the shared desire to isolate themselves from others
whom they perceive as different in some significant way. Restric-
tions on use or transfer of their property interests reflect this shared
desire. These restrictions, including age restrictions, behavioral
prohibitions, and the like, are not simply instrumental devices
designed to realize the shared goal of homogeneity according to
some specific social characteristic. Rather, they are powerful sym-
bols of the existence of a consciously shared commitment to a par-
ticular mode of residential life.
The shared desire of a group to isolate itself-a shared need to
acknowledge difference in a tangible and extreme manner-under-
scores the group's communitarian character. Intentional communi-
ties are characterized by psychological and often physical isolation,
from the larger society. As Laurence Veysey reminds us, "Commu-
nity building is no less than an act of internal secession."180 Gabriel
Garcia Marquez's justly celebrated novel One Hundred Years of Soli-
tude' 8 ' illustrates how a community can flourish within conditions of
physical and psychological isolation, and how physical forms of iso-
lation may be necessary for the community to maintain itself. Garcia
Marquez's narrative fabulously (literally, through use of fable) de-
picts how the once-isolated jungle village of Macondo progressively
loses its communal character with each new invasion of elements
from the outside World. As the outside gradually integrates with the
village, it increasingly corrupts and weakens the communal charac-
ter of social relationships within Macondo. 182
179 See supra Part IV(B).
180 L. VEYSEY, supra note 94, at 7.
181 GABRIEL GARCIA MARQUEZ, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF SOLITUDE (1970).
182 The most extreme form of physical social isolation, hermitage, paradoxically may
be entirely compatible with community. Thomas Merton's eventual hermitage within
the Trappist monastery of Gethsemani in Kentucky illustrates how the thriving of the
self as constituted by the community may require physical separation in order to main-
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Community is created not only by physical isolation, but also by
the group's symbology. "Isolation is not always a matter of geogra-
phy or of special interest. It may also be the product of seclusion
behind communal boundaries, such as those which communities
contrive through symbolic means."' 8 3 The same device may serve
to create and maintain group isolation both instrumentally and sym-
bolically. More specifically, the boundary-maintaining device's
eventual failure to perform its instrumental function adequately,
due to social or ideological changes, will intensify its symbolic work
in maintaining the group's separate identity. A wall, for example,
continues symbolically to mark the boundary of a territorial group
even though it does not physically prevent outsiders from entering
or insiders from exiting.
The symbolic and instrumental constitution of community
boundaries, defining in consciousness the isolated space that char-
acterizes the communitarian experience, provides a perspective
from which to understand the significance of residential association
restrictions on property transfers and specified forms of social be-
havior. These restrictions do not simply screen out social factors
that the groups consider unassimilable. They have both internal
and public meanings. Publicly, they constitute the "mask,"' 1 4 or
identity, that the community presents to the outside world. Inter-
nally, they are the objects of the residential community's internal
discourse. In their private mode, the restrictions are symbolically
complex and differentiated, with members attaching different mean-
ings to the restrictions and to the grout's identity constituted by
those restrictions. The public face, however, must be simpler. That
is, with respect to the inside-outside relationship, the restrictions
must transmit a coherent message of group identity. 18 5 The group,
tain community. See MICHAEL MoTr, THE SEVEN MOUNTAINS OF THOMAS MERTON 337-
468 (1984).
183 A. COHEN, supra note 88, at 35.
Meron Benvenisti, an Israeli historian who is currently director of the West Bank
Data Project, recently observed how community boundary-creation shifts forms with so-
cial change. Commenting on the failure of the physical unification in Jerusalem (after
the Six Day War) to end communitarian isolation, Benvenisti states:
Indeed, the absence of physical barriers reinforced the need for emo-
tional ones. Segregation and alienation cut across all levels of communal
interactions, from nursery to graveyard, and cannot be explained merely
as a product of disagreements about the political future ofJerusalem. So
basic is the cleavage that a decisive component of the self-identity ofJews
and Arabs alike is not who they are, but rather, who they are not.
Meron Benvenisti, Two Generations: Growing Up in Jerusalem, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1988
(magazine), at 34, 36.
184 The notion of a community's boundary as its public "mask" is drawn from A.
COHEN, supra note 88, at 73-74.
185 For a discussion of the analogous problem with fraternity, see WILSON CAREY
MCWILLIAMS, THE IDEA OF FRATERNITY IN AMERICA 1-111 (1974). McWilliams points
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therefore, will want to retain autonomous control of its internal re-
strictions to ensure that the public meaning of the restriction em-
phasizes the group's external differentiation.18 6
But it is just at this point that we experience a deep ambivalence
about communities and communal autonomy. One of the central
dilemmas of community concerns the relationship between the
group and the rest of society, or what I will call the paradox of ex-
clusion. Communities by their very nature exclude. Precisely be-
cause they are constituted by shared commitments to some specific
good they must, in symbolic effect if not in conscious intention, ex-
clude some members of the society, precluding those individuals
from participating in the group's internal life.'8 7 But by excluding
others, communitarian groups radically limit their capacity to de-
velop sympathy for others and thereby contradict the communitar-
ian ideal itself. The group must appeal to its shared values to justify
its exclusiveness. In the communitarian tradition, groups ground
their shared values in the ideal of community. But that ideal must
be one that the communitarian groups regard as a universal ideal,188
out that fraternity, as an interpersonal bond that involves shared values, "implies a nec-
essary tension with loyalty to society at large." Id. at 8.
186 The rhetoric of private ordering as an explanation and justification for legal non-
intervention with residential group rules does not capture the symbolic meaning of such
rules. The private ordering perspective ignores the distinction between the group's in-
ternal discourse and its public discourse, and, with respect to the latter, it misses the
symbolic constitution of the group. Robert Cover appreciated the symbology of legal
devices for social groups, stating:
The point... is not only that private lawmaking takes place through
... contract, property, and corporate law ... but also that... various
groups use these universally accepted and well-understood devices to
create an entire nomos-an integrated world of obligation and reality from
which the rest of the world is perceived. At that point of radical transfor-
mation of perspective, the boundary rule-whether it be contract, free
exercise of religion, property, or corporation law-becomes more than a
rule: it becomes a constitution of a world.
Cover, supra note 124, at 31.
187 Robert Cover discussed the need for what he called paideic communities (i.e.,
communities constituted by a common narrative and education that is embedded in
their internal, normative world) to exclude because new normative meanings of the
group's basic narrative would create deviant paideic communities. Id. at 14-15. My point
is that the need of communities to exclude is not limited to the intensely normative sorts
of groups that Cover described as paideic, but extends to all groups consciously consti-
tuted by a shared commitment to particular visions of the good.
188 This is not to suggest that community, as an ideal, escapes the problem of exclu-
sion. Iris Marion Young has recently pointed out that while "the excluding conse-
quences of the universalist ideal of a public that embodies a common will are... subtle,
... they still obtain." Iris Marion Young, Polity and Group Diference: A Critique of the Ideal
of Universal Citizenship, 99 ETHics 250, 253 (1989). Precisely for this reason, the use of
community as a political ideal must be pragmatic, or stated differently, strategic. See also
Marilyn Friedman, Feminism and Modern Friendship: Dislocating the Community, 99 ETmcs
275, 277 (1989) ("[Clommunitarian philosophy as a whole is a perilous ally for feminist
theory.").
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that is, one that the group attempts to universalize even while recog-
nizing that it is, after all, an ideal. If they define it according to their
own shared values then their argument is merely circular and ques-
tion-begging. Communitarian moral thought emphasizes the ideal
of community as the basis for resolving the self-other problem, rec-
onciling our individuality with our sociability. Particularized shared
values reproduce rather than resolve that problem. But if the group
does broaden its shared values so that it becomes increasingly inclu-
sive rather than exclusive, what will remain of the group's identity?
A related problem of community concerns its internal relations.
Restrictions are important for maintaining, symbolically and instru-
mentally, the community's identity not only in its public face but
also within itself. Restrictions on specific forms of behavior-what
religious or sexual practices are acceptable, what range of books
may be read, or even more seemingly innocuous behavioral restric-
tions, like restrictions on the consumption of alcohol or tobacco-
create the community's boundary in its own internal consciousness.
Although members may give restrictions different meanings, the
community cannot permit its members freely to opt out of all of its
restrictions while remaining members of the community. 189 What
Unger calls the "paradox of group cohesion"' 90 exists because of
communitarian theory's commitment to protect rather than
subordinate the individual self. As Unger observes, "By its very na-
ture, community is always on the verge of becoming oppression."''
To prevent community from destroying individuality, groups must
189 Interestingly, Robert Nozick reaches the same conclusion about communities de-
spite his commitment to the principle of individual liberty. In his ideal of libertarian
utopia, the liberty principle applies to the state framework but not internally to commu-
nities. Thus he states:
It is not a general principle that every community or group must al-
low internal opting out when that is feasible. For sometimes such inter-
nal opting out would itself change the character of the group from that
desired.... Yet... a nation should offer this opportunity; people have a
right to so opt out of a nation's requirements.
R. NozicK, supra note 103, at 321. In Nozick's view, communities must be free to experi-
ment in self-expression for individual humans to be free, for individuals work through
communities to realize themselves. But, while Nozick recognizes the sociability of the
self to this extent, he does not recognize the full extent of sociability. Nozick arbitrarily
halts the principle of sociability at the community's boundary. Obligations that arise
from connections with others do not extend to persons outside the community. At the
same time, Nozick does not explain why individual freedom must be subordinated to
communal solidarity within the community. His strategy defines away, rather than con-
fronts, the problem of the self's relationship with others, within the community as well
as without.
190 R. UNGER, supra note 8, at 266.
191 Id. Nancy Rosenblum has pointed out how feminism has been particularly sensi-
tive to the risk of communitarianism:
The feminist point of view reminds us that pluralist communitarian-
ism can be limiting rather than liberating if it refers to conventional ex-
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allow members to opt out. But communitarian theory's simultane-
ous commitment to individuality may at times require that the group
not compel its members to choose between either participation in
the group at the price of obedience to the group's interpretation of
its internal restrictions, or freedom to behave according to one's
own interpretation of the group's identity but at the cost of leaving
the group. In the vocabulary popularized by Albert Hirschman, 192
to the two options of loyalty and exit, a third must be added, voice.
Diversity, both of groups and within groups, must be protected in
order that group life may serve as the condition under which indi-
viduals may simultaneously realize their individuality and their
sociability.
The necessity of maintaining the voice option for group mem-
bers, derived from the communitarian ideal itself, requires that
communitarians reject the norm of strong communal autonomy.
Rather, communitarianism requires limited communal autonomy, or
open-ended autonomy. The notion of open-ended group autonomy
is not oxymoronic. Strong communal autonomy would realize the
risk of community becoming oppressive. No communal autonomy
would realize the opposite risk, eliminating group life for the sake of
the atomized individual. Open-ended autonomy strives to reconcile
individuality with sociability, diversity with unity. It seeks, even if it
does not succeed in doing so, to resolve the paradoxes of exclusion
and group cohesion.
Putting the norm of open-ended autonomy into action requires
state involvement. The role of the state is to maintain pluralism
among communitarian groups. To this extent, pluralist and com-
munitarian theories agree. But, unlike pluralist theory, which does
not recognize community as a normative ideal, communitarian the-
ory attaches significance to group pluralism and diversity because
they protect individuality without sacrificing community. For com-
munitarians, the politics of pluralism is not a politics of fear or
moral relativism but a politics of progressive reformulations of the
good. Unger expresses this politics in terms of a "spiral of domina-
tion and community."' 93 As groups formulate their shared values
under increasing conditions of equality of power, they progressively
approach the ideal of community.
ternal structures, especially ones that are coercive and exploitative.
"Embeddedness" can mean being stuck.
N. ROSENBLUM, supra note 71, at 156. It is precisely because residential associations are,
or may be, coercive structures that the communitarian ideal of community requires that
they be denied strong autonomy.
192 See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
193 R. UNGER, supra note 8, at 246; see also id. at 242-48, 278-79.
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Communitarian thought, then, contemplates that society itself
is what Robert Cover called an "imperialistic" community, i.e., an
"organization of distinct nomic entities."1 94 It is composed of a
multiplicity of groups having differing normative understandings.
This mode of social organization inevitably carries with it limiting
and coercive implications for discrete communities. Pluralism cre-
ates a tension between unity and diversity. As the basic framework
for communities, pluralism implies that a multiplicity of diverse
communities must be allowed to exist so that the good remains sub-
ject to reformulation through continual public conversations among
the groups. But diversity requires a common commitment to main-
tain that framework. That is to say, to maintain space for new nomic
groups to contribute to the conversation about the good, individual
communities sometimes must be constrained from grabbing too
much power.195 No single group within a pluralistic communitarian
society can be permitted to arrogate to itself unilateral control over
the inside-outside problem. There must be some agency that is re-
sponsible for maintaining the basic framework within which a variety
of groups can engage in a dynamic process of formulating and refor-
mulating the good. Communitarians have properly insisted that this
dialogic, participatory form of politics ultimately must involve un-
mediated conversations among groups and individuals. 96 So long
as groups and individuals speak only through some filter, their au-
tonomy is limited, and the problem of domination remains present.
At the same time, though, the risk of domination is just as real if
such conversations occur under conditions which provide no mech-
anism for preserving the basic social framework.
Courts are an appropriate institution to maintain that frame-
work. Through the dialogic process of adjudication, courts can
serve as a bridge between communities and society, preventing the
former from lapsing into a solipsistic perspective that would pervert
194 Cover, supra note 124, at 13 n.36.
195 The problem of communities grabbing too much power-controlling the inside-
outside problem-also occurs in the analogous context of municipalities. For example,
one way of understanding the controversial Mount Laurel 1 decision, Southern Burling-
ton NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983), is to see it as
an attempt to prevent municipal communities from subverting community as an ideal of
boundaries, as opposed to walls. The court objected to Mt. Laurel's behavior in effect
because the municipality had unilaterally attempted to define the boundaries of its com-
munity, with substantial exclusionary consequences. The court imposed on the munici-
pality a constitutional obligation "to provide a realistic opportunity for a fair share of the
region's present and prospective low and moderate income housing need" in an effort
to prevent the municipality from perverting the ideal of community. See generally Alan
David Freeman, Give and Take: Distributing Local Environmental Control Through Land-Use
Regulation, 60 MINN. L. REV. 883 (1976); Harold McDougall, TheJudicial Struggle Against
Exclusionary Zoning: The New Jersey Paradigm, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 625 (1979).
196 See, e.g., B. BARBER, supra note 8, at 261; Frug, supra note 8.
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the ideal of community and, at the same time, inhibiting sheer ma-
joritarianism from denying a community's opportunity to formulate
a conception of the good. 197 As the bridge metaphor implies, the
role of the legal system is to connect nomic groups with the rest of
society even while recognizing their separateness. Disputes over the
enforcement of group restrictions present opportunities for a dia-
logue about the group's shared values and the extent to which they
advance the ideal of community or impede it by creating relations of
domination.
This conception of the judicial role requires a form of legal in-
volvement that is itself open-ended. This requirement suggests that
standards should be preferred to rules. Rules speak with an author-
ity that inhibits, or indeed precludes, conversation.19 8 They are de-
vices of dead hand control, attempting to appropriate human action.
They purport to be imperial, constraining rather than initiating a
dialectic. Concededly, the contrast between rules and standards can
be overdrawn. Adjudication using standards is likely to lead to reg-
ularities concerning discrete legal issues, creating norms that
strongly resemble rules. But the legal environment that exists in a
regime of standards, even with such regular decisional patterns, is
not identical to that of a regime of rules. Standards send out the
message that the question is never closed and that decisional pat-
terns are constantly vulnerable to challenge. By contrast, the sym-
bolic meaning of rules is closure and constraint. That their
constraining effect in practice is far from complete, making the ef-
fect of any given rule ultimately contingent upon a choice of under-
lying normative visions, 199 does not alter their anti-dialogic
character, for their public meaning is to discourage dialogue. They
strive for closure that makes it pointless to engage those outside
one's nomic universe in conversation.
By contrast, open-ended legal norms, precisely because they do
not purport to have achieved closure ex ante, create opportunities for
those inside and those outside to engage each other in dialogue.
They deny to both sides the apparently comforting message that
their side is legally privileged. By informing the respective partici-
197 See Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE LJ. 1493, 1532 (1988).
198 For similar critiques in the context of takings adjudications, see Gregory S. Alex-
ander, Takings, Narratives, and Power, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1752, 1772-73 (1988) (arguing
for a fluid takings methodology in order to maintain public conversations about the
political choices made in takings law); Frank I. Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM L.
REV. 1600, 1625-29 (1988) (arguing that ad hoc adjudication is compatible with the rule
of law ideal); Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1667, 1680-84 (1988) (same). See also Michelman, supra note 197, at 1493; MargaretJ.
Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U.L. REV. 781 (1989).
199 See M. KELMAN, supra note 62; Kennedy, supra note 62.
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pants that the regulatory norm has not yet been created, they en-
courage the participants to create, through eventual consensus, that
norm themselves.
Open-ended norms advance the communitarian ideal in an-
other respect in addition to encouraging direct dialogue. When the
locus of the disagreement shifts to a court, open-ended norms com-
mit the court to a dialogic process. Frank Michelman expresses this
communitarian conception of the judicial role as one of "resolving
normative disputes by conversation, a communicative practice of
open and intelligible reason-giving, as opposed to self-justifying im-
pulse and ipse dixit."' 200 That communicative practice fulfills one of
the indispensable requirements of the communitarian regulative
ideal by committing the court to regard all of the affected persons
not as remote role-occupants but as concrete persons. Standards
require that the court contextually inquire into the interests of these
individuals in this situation. Reconstructing their life-world is a path
by which the court gains not merely familiarity with the affected in-
dividuals and groups, but the basis for its own communitarian con-
nection with them-empathy.
Having articulated the court's task as one of gaining empathetic
knowledge of the group, we must immediately acknowledge a funda-
mental problem of method that this task creates. The court's per-
spective must derive from some particular situation; the "view from
nowhere" 20 1 is not available to us. This situation will not be that of
the group, of which the court is to gain empathetic knowledge. How
can the court, embedded in its own situation, gain such knowledge
of a different culture without distorting the difference that consti-
tutes the very identity of the group as a social other?
It is no coincidence that this problem is the same as that facing
anthropology202 -the problem of incommensurability. 20 3 The com-
munitarian conception of the judicial role is anthropological. The
court's task is to meet a different culture on its own terms, to trans-
late, as it were, that culture's normative universe into terms intelligi-
ble by those outside the culture. The incommensurability of the
200 Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Govern-
ment, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4, 34 (1986).
201 See THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1986).
202 See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, "From the Native's Point of View": On the Nature of Anthropo-
logical Understanding, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHRO-
POLOGY 55 (1983).
203 Although Geertz does not himself use the term "incommensurability," it is clear
from his methodological essay From the Native's Point of View, supra note 202, that he
understands the anthropologist's interpretive problem precisely in terms of incommen-
surability. The problem of incommensurability in the social sciences is lucidly discussed
in RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEU-
TICS, AND PRAxis 51-108 (1983).
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cultures does not mean that this task is impossible. Incommensura-
bility simply means, as Thomas Kuhn has explained, that there is
"no common language within which both [cultures] could be fully
expressed and which could therefore be used in a point-by-point
comparison between them." 20 4 Translation does not require that
the cultures be commensurable; it requires only an overlapping of
horizons. 20 5 Such a sharing of experiences enables the translator to
engage in what Clifford Geertz has called a "dialectical tacking" 206
between the culture's local details and the general experiences
shared by the culture being studied and the translator. This means
that the judicial role contemplated by communitarian theory re-
mains plausible despite differences between the group and the rest
of society (including the court).
Standards comport with the conception of community de-
scribed here in a final sense, growing out of the experience of empa-
thy for both sides that the court gains through its contextual inquiry.
The open-ended character of standards allows the court to acknowl-
edge and articulate the sense of ambivalence about communal au-
tonomy that results from recognition of the dilemmas of group
autonomy, especially community's dark side, i.e., exclusion of
others. The message that ambivalence communicates to the group
is sympathy with their project, but a sympathy that is qualified by an
insistence that the group continually must strive to realize the ideal
of community by permitting dissenters both within and without the
group continuously to attack its boundaries.2 0 7
With respect to the problem of residential association restric-
tions, this conception of the judicial role suggests that the recent
decisional trend replacing per se rules with the norm of reasonable-
ness is appropriate to the group-character of common interest de-
velopments. Per se rules, either sustaining or invalidating asso-
ciation restrictions, would preclude courts from the dialogic inquiry
that the ideal of community demands. A rule of per se invalidity
would deny group autonomy altogether; its polar opposite risks
community becoming self-defeating. The reasonableness standard
harmonizes with the communitarian conception by requiring that
decisions concerning the enforceability of association restrictions be
made deliberately and socially.
204 Thomas S. Kuhn, Theory-Change as Structure-Change: Comments on the Sneed Formal-
ism, 10 ERKENNTNIS 178, 191 (1976).
205 Drucilla Cornell, Taking Hegel Seriously, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 139, 150-51 (1985).
206 C. GEERTZ, supra note 202, at 69.
207 See R. UNGER, supra note 8, at 289 ("The community needs to remain a particular
group, yet it must also become a universal one."). As Professor Shiffrin has pointed out,
dissent, far from expressing an alienated attitude, is an act of socialization. See S. Shif-
frin, supra note 74.
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That the reasonableness norm is open-ended and conversation-
inducing does not imply that it provides no direction. Reasonable-
ness is to be judged within a particular normative context or culture.
The relevant normative culture is not that of any specific group, but
the culture of a society committed to the ideal of community. We
can perhaps best understand the character of that culture through a
metaphorical distinction between walls and boundaries. The nor-
mative culture that I am describing is one of boundaries, and not of
walls.
Far from being synonyms for each other, "walls" and "bounda-
ries" have very different semantic dusters. Looking to dictionary
substitutes208 for "wall," like "barrier," "fortification," and "enclo-
sure," 20 9 indicates that, when we speak of walls, we do not have in
mind an act of merely neutral separation. There is a sense of defen-
siveness, suggesting fear or antagonism between what is being
walled in and walled out. By contrast, substitutes for "boundary,"
like "border" or "mark," 210 leave open the possibility of comple-
mentariness between the parts. The act of separation may suggest
not only a neutral relationship between the parts, but also a rela-
tionship of compatibility. Boundaries join;2 1' walls isolate.
Although the normative culture within which courts are to
judge the reasonableness of group practices is one of boundaries,
in practice, some walls must be created. We must recognize some
rules prohibiting certain instances of exclusion for pragmatic rea-
sons. In particular, we must carry forward the extant legal rule
prohibiting exclusion based on race.2 12 Such rules are pragmatically
required in the sense that, so long as social practices and institutions
have acted upon the ideal of community only partially, leaving many
areas of social life vulnerable to domination, the risk that domina-
tion would pervert community by permitting certain exclusionary
practices is too great for communitarians to tolerate, despite their
basic commitment to maintaining public conversations.
In arguing that judicial review under the reasonableness stan-
dard comports with communitarian theory, I do not suggest that
those courts which have shifted to that norm in reviewing residential
association restrictions are themselves communitarian in outlook.
My point is rather that the communitarian theory that I have de-
scribed neither requires nor permits strong group autonomy. It re-
208 On the use of dictionaries in ordinary language analysis, see STANLEY CAVELL,
MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY? (1969).
209 See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 1642 (ed.
1966).
210 d at 172.
211 See NORMAN 0. BROWN, LOVE'S BODY 141-61 (1966).
212 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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quires that groups remain connected with others. The implication
of this requirement for the legal system is a dialogic form of involve-
ment. Judicial reasonableness review, which denies strong commu-
nal autonomy but also respects difference, is the legal response that
best harmonizes with that requirement. Legal intervention in the
form of an open-ended standard is not a matter of groups ceding
autonomy to courts, but a matter of groups remaining open to a
continuing public conversation that, by connecting and reconnect-
ing groups and others, progressively reiterates and reinforces the
ideal of community.
CONCLUSION
In arguing against strong forms of legal autonomy for groups-
either through a complete prohibition of judicial review or a mini-
malist requirement of consistency with the group's internal objec-
tives-I by no means intend to put groups in jeopardy. To the
contrary, I consider it vital that group life be preserved and en-
couraged in American society. Group life offers a haven into which
Americans may escape from the dehumanizing forms of social life
that so clearly mark our post-modernist culture. It is only through
group life that individuals can hope to avoid the experience of alien-
ation that pervades our increasingly bureaucratic society. The long-
ing to "huddle together with [one's] own kind"2 13 reflects not some
romantic vision of communal life, but a human instinct to be known
concretely and to be accepted by others as a distinct personality.
But there is a constant risk that groups may develop into nomic
bunkers. The experience of group life will exacerbate, rather than
resolve, the problem of alienation if groups themselves exist as au-
tonomous units, unconnected with others. To realize their potential
for creating community, groups must be held to an obligation more
demanding than mere compliance with their own internal aspira-
tions. Groups must accept a civic obligation to maintain community
within our society. Meeting that obligation requires a praxis of
openness and dialogue.
As a final way of expressing the relationship between commu-
nity and dialogue, I want to return to the metaphorical distinction
drawn earlier between walls and boundaries. In Robert Frost's
poem "Mending Wall," Frost narrates the experience of two neigh-
bors ritualistically maintaining the wall that separates them and re-
lates that experience to community and dialogue. While he does
not reject boundaries or autonomy, Frost is uneasy with walls. More
specifically, he is critical of individuals who maintain walls simply for
213 Benvenisti, supra note 183, at 71.
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the sake of having walls, separating without purpose, and foreclos-
ing the kind of dialogue that would allow individuals to discover
their shared values. His narrator expresses this anxiety directly:21 4
Before I built a wall I'd ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offense.
The consequence of unreflectively maintaining walls is social aliena-
tion. The neighbors are neighbors only in the barest, physical
sense. Their capacity for community-creating dialogue has ended,
as Frost indicates by describing his neighbor's remoteness:2 1 5
He moves in darkness as it seems to me,
Not of woods only and the shade of trees.
He will not go behind his father's saying,
And he likes having thought of it so well
He says again, 'Good fences make good neighbors.'
Genuine community requires dialogue, robust and continuous.
Such dialogue can occur even while boundaries are maintained; in-
deed it may require boundaries. But it cannot occur in the presence
of walls. The challenge for legal intervention is to eliminate social
walls by encouraging dialogue while simultaneously protecting the
boundaries that make distinctive group life possible. Meeting that
challenge requires the transformative capability of imagination.
The imagination that we need must be chastened by humility to
avoid hubris, but it must not be corroded by a cynicism masked as
realism. My aim in this Article has been to show that the choice
between communitarian theory and pluralist/public choice theory
amounts to a choice between imagination and cynicism. Given these
alternatives, we have no choice at all.
214 Robert Frost, Mending Wall, in SELECTED POEMS OF ROBERT FROST 23, 24 (Rine-
hart ed. 1963).
215 Id.
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